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INTRODUCTION
San Francisco is the home of the platform economy. 1 Uber and
Airbnb—the poster children of that economy—launched their initial products
*
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1
See PETER C. EVANS & ANNABELLE GAWER, CTR. FOR GLOB. ENTER., THE RISE OF THE
PLATFORM ENTERPRISE: A GLOBAL SURVEY 11 (2016), https://thecge.net/wp-
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in the city and used the feedback garnered from Bay Area users to perfect
their business models.2 These and other platform companies also started to
build their loyal user bases with Bay Area consumers.3 But, if San Francisco
nurtured Uber and Airbnb,4 New York helped them grow.5 Based on news
stories of what was happening in San Francisco and New York, the tech

content/uploads/2016/01/PDF-WEB-Platform-Survey_01_12.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4HACJ2Z8] (“The highest concentration of platform headquarters is found in the San Francisco Bay
Area.”); see also The Online Platform Economy: Who Earns the Most?, JP MORGAN CHASE
INST. (May 5, 2016) https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/institute/insight-onlineplatform-econ-earnings.htm [https://perma.cc/MC6A-EFT2] (“West Coast cities are the
epicenter of the Online Platform Economy, with San Francisco topping the charts.”).
2
See There’s an App for That, ECONOMIST (Dec. 30, 2014), https://www.economist.com/news
/briefing/21637355-freelance-workers-available-moments-notice-will-reshape-nature-compan
ies-and [https://perma.cc/7JHY-JHR3]; Biz Carson, How Three Guys Turned Renting an Air
Mattress in Their Apartment into a $25 Billion Company, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 23, 2016, 11:22
AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-airbnb-was-founded-a-visual-history-2016-2
[https://perma.cc/9BWS-J3MN]
(describing
Airbnb’s
initial
launch
as
airbedandbreakfast.com in San Francisco).
3
BRAD STONE, THE UPSTARTS: HOW UBER, AIRBNB, AND THE KILLER COMPANIES OF THE
NEW SILICON VALLEY ARE CHANGING THE WORLD 107–24 (2017) (describing Uber’s growth
in San Francisco); LEIGH GALLAGHER, THE AIRBNB STORY: HOW THREE ORDINARY GUYS
DISRUPTED AN INDUSTRY, MADE BILLIONS . . . AND CREATED PLENTY OF CONTROVERSY 8–23
(2017); cf. Ryan Lawler, On-Demand Delivery Startup Postmates Raises $16 Million from
Spark Capital, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 18, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/2014/02/18/postmates16m-spark-capital/ [https://perma.cc/PW3P-VY8Z] (noting that Postmates launched in San
Francisco and has grown in subsequent markets).
4
The availability and value of the tech community in San Francisco as a source of early
adopters to give feedback on a new product or service is recognized by many entrepreneurs.
See, e.g., Morgan Brown, Uber—What’s Fueling Uber’s Growth Engine?, GROWTHHACKERS
(2013), https://growthhackers.com/growth-studies/uber [https://perma.cc/E3EN-6BJF] (“Uber
knew that launching in San Francisco meant that they would be interacting regularly with the
tech community who are continually looking for new tools and services that improve their
quality of life.”).
5
Airbnb found users for its services in New York in 2008, and quickly realized better
photographs of listed properties were essential to attract bookings. See GALLAGHER, supra
note 3, at 27; see also Jenna Wortham, With a Startup Company, a Ride Is Just a Tap of an
App Away, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/04/technology/04rid
e.html [https://nyti.ms/2qjdWaI] (“New York is a different beast than San Francisco when it
comes to public transportation, and in much of the city there is often no shortage of ways to
get around.”).
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community and others nationwide began to catch wind of the disruption that
was heading their way.6
This disruption would not just involve new products and services
affecting existing businesses. It would also serve as notice of the regulatory
challenges that followed the entry of Uber and Airbnb into each new market.
Government officials in California and the state of New York made national
headlines as they struggled to apply existing consumer protections and
licensing fees to these innovative services.7 In many ways, the states of
California and New York and the cities of San Francisco and New York
became crucibles for the development of regulatory policies to govern
companies such as Uber and Airbnb. These solutions were often used as
templates in other jurisdictions.8 Nevertheless, it has been anything but a
smooth process for government officials, entrepreneurs, or consumers.

6

See, e.g., Michael Arrington, Huge Vote of Confidence: Uber Raises $11 Million from
Benchmark Capital, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 14, 2011), https://techcrunch.com/2011/02/14/hugevote-of-confidence-uber-raises-11-million-from-benchmark-capital/ [https://perma.cc/53MLJ5AE] (describing Uber’s innovation and post-money valuation of $60 million within eight
months of initial launch in San Francisco); Scott Austin, Airbnb: From Y Combinator to
$112M Funding in Three Years, WALL ST. J. (July 25, 2011), https://blogs.wsj.com/ventureca
pital/2011/07/25/airbnb-from-y-combinator-to-112m-funding-in-three-years/
[https://perma.cc/V2JL-FMQF] (describing the growth of Airbnb after being accepted into Y
Combinator).
7
See Anthony Ha, California Regulator Passes First Ridesharing Rules, a Big Win for Lyft,
Sidecar, and Uber, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 19, 2013), https://techcrunch.com/2013/09/19/cpucridesharing-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/JCN8-VHT5]; see also Vauhini Vara, Uber, Lyft,
and Liability, NEW YORKER (Nov. 4, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/u
ber-lyft-liability [https://perma.cc/S54Q-A8DC] (noting liability concerns for both Uber and
Airbnb); cf. Ryan Lawler, Airbnb Will Begin Collecting Transient Occupancy Taxes for San
Francisco Bookings Next Month, TECHCRUNCH, (Sept. 17, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/201
4/09/17/airbnb-sf-occupancy-taxes/ [https://perma.cc/KWF7-NXVE].
8
See Emma Hinchliffe, No Vacancy: How Airbnb’s New York City Problem Is Just Getting
Worse, MASHABLE, http://mashable.com/2017/04/03/airbnb-nyc-no-vacancy/#Zbv5o8QcFPq
h [https://perma.cc/T7EH-VW4J] (“[O]ther cities that are growing in dissatisfaction with the
company’s rapid takeover are watching for tips on how to fight their own battles.”); see also
Tomio
Geron,
California
Becomes
First
State
to
Regulate
Ridesharing Services Lyft, Sidecar, UberX, FORBES (Sept. 19, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/tomiogeron/2013/09/19/california-becomes-first-state-to-regulate-ridesharing-serviceslyft-sidecar-uberx/#75f3f51b1804 [https://perma.cc/F2LN-YEMW] (discussing California’s
rules and their potential as a model for other states).
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Headlines about the ongoing battles fill news feeds even now, almost 10 years
after Uber and Airbnb were founded.9
This article begins by examining how the different characteristics and
cultures of Silicon Valley and City Hall set the scene for the confrontations to
come. With that context in mind, we dive into the specifics of the battles
between Uber and Airbnb on one side and California and New York
regulators on the other. Those specifics help to illuminate why and how the
current regulatory system is ill equipped to achieve its goals—consumer
safety, competitive fairness, and nondiscrimination, among others10—while
also supporting innovation and technological change.
These regulatory struggles have harmed everyone involved.
Consumers have not been fully protected as they try out platform company
services; regulators and policymakers have spent untold hours and
government funds attempting to enforce existing regulations; and Uber and
Airbnb have paid huge fees, penalties, and litigation costs as their battles have
moved to the courts.11 Moreover, society in general is harmed as important
policy and economic goals are often lost on the battleground of innovation
versus regulation.12
9

Winnie Hu, As Uber Woos More Drivers, Taxis Hit Back, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 18, 2017)
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/18/nyregion/nyc-taxi-center-uber.html
[https://nyti.ms/2nDhhQD]; Megan Rose Dickey, Airbnb Settles Lawsuit with San Francisco,
TECHCRUNCH, (May 1, 2017) https://techcrunch.com/2017/05/01/airbnb-settles-lawsuit-withsan-francisco/ [https://perma.cc/LJ4V-NPSV].
10
See, About the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N,
http://cpuc.ca.gov/aboutus/ [https://perma.cc/C7ZS-7QBX]; see also N.Y.C. Taxi and Limo
Comm’n, About TLC, NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/about/about.shtml
[https://perma.cc/SQ82-2X67]; S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 41A.2. (2017).
11
Heather Kelly, Uber’s Never-ending Stream of Lawsuits, CNN (Aug. 11, 2016),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/08/11/technology/uber-lawsuits/index.html
[https://perma.cc/A2ZW-3MM3]. In 2016, Airbnb filed a number of lawsuits in federal court
to head off restrictive rules issued by local regulators after the company refused to cooperate
with prior laws. See text, infra at Part II, Section A(2). In San Francisco, Airbnb has had to
accept criminal liability if it fails to comply with city short-term rental laws. S.F. ADMIN.
CODE § 41A.5.e (2017).
12
In 2014, the Supreme Court ruled against television show streaming company Aereo in a
decision that ultimately led to its bankruptcy. Emily Steel, Aereo Concedes Defeat and Files
for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/busin
ess/aereo-files-for-bankruptcy.html [https://nyti.ms/2my0gGZ]. Digital health companies with
mobile native apps that track user consumption and activity face a number of regulatory
hurdles. See Samuel Waxman et al., Legal Health Isn’t Easy for Digital Health
Companies, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 13, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/04/13/legal-good-
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These issues are not new. Regulatory history is replete with examples
of innovative businesses in high demand by consumers—think railroads,
telephone, and airlines13—that regulators took “command” of to ensure
consumer safety and prevent price gouging and other unfair business
practices. After decades of use, many of these regulations failed to function
effectively as business and society changed. In response, all these industries
were ultimately deregulated, creating another set of problems. Is there no
other path for innovative, high-growth businesses other than strictly regulated
or unregulated? In this article, we posit that there is.
In Part I, we discuss how regulators and platform companies arrived at
this point of tension. In Part II, we detail how regulators’ attempts to control
Uber and Airbnb resulted in harm to both sides. In Part III, we suggest a better
way to regulate innovative companies.
We know that new disruptive technologies are just around the corner
whether they are autonomous vehicles, smart contracts on blockchain
platforms, ambient artificial intelligence systems in our homes and cars, or
something yet to be envisioned. How do we prepare to regulate technology we
do not really understand yet? We argue that this can be achieved by creating a
collaborative, flexible, nimble process of regulation that involves all industry
and regulatory stakeholders. In current models of regulation, this is not
health-isnt-easy-for-digital-health-companies/ [https://perma.cc/JBG3-TAVZ]. The SEC has
made a number of fintech founders nervous by opening up new conversations on regulation.
See Nik Milanovic, An Obscure Regulatory Debate Has Put the Entire U.S. Fintech
Community on Edge, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 24, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/04/24/anobscure-regulatory-debate-has-put-the-entire-u-s-fintech-community-on-edge/
[https://perma.cc/U9U7-K9C7].
13
Although not widely known to be the beginning of the American administrative state, the
steamboat industry was the first large-scale American industry to be regulated at the local,
then state, and then national level. Intense competition along the Mississippi River led to
reckless steamboat driving and fatal steam engine explosions along the busy trade route. As a
result, The Steamboat Act of 1837 was written to protect consumers and consumer goods. The
1837 Act relied on private enforcement mechanisms. It was followed up by the Steamboat Act
of 1853, which removed the private enforcement mechanisms and applied administrative
adjudications such as fines or the revocation of a license. Railroads went through a similar
regulatory path. Economic downturns, safety concerns, and a need for regulatory continuity
between states led Congress to enact the Interstate Commerce Act, which gave Congress the
right to regulate interstate railroads to protect consumers and facilitate healthy competition.
See Reuel Schiller, The Historical Origins of American Regulatory Exceptionalism, in
COMPARATIVE LAW AND REGULATION: UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL REGULATORY
PROCESS 55–70 (Francesca Bignami & David Zaring eds., 2016).

8

GEORGETOWN LAW TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

Vol 2:1

possible,14 but in Part III, we explore whether there is a way to create a
different regulatory process by utilizing principles of design thinking, a
method that has proven its worth in product design, system design, and
infrastructure design, and is now making its way into the processes of
government.15 We provide an understanding of design thinking in general and
then detail the steps involved to create a new regulatory process using design
thinking.16 By putting such a regulatory process in place, consumers and
innovative businesses will know that both society’s best interests and
innovation will be supported regardless of when the next disruption appears.

14

Many regulatory processes include a notice and comment period during which businesses
and members of the public can suggest changes to proposed rules. See OFFICE OF THE
FED. REGISTER, GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS, https://www.federalregister.gov/uploa
ds/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf [https://perma.cc/YSR9-CMJ3] (describing how
comments are solicited from the public and how those comments are used by agencies to issue
final rules); CAL OFFICE OF ADMIN. LAW, GUIDE TO PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE
REGULATORY PROCESS, https://www.oal.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/28/2017/05/How-2Participate-102016.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UWS-8XPZ] (describing the notice and comment
process in California).
15
See generally Christian Bason, Design-Led Innovation in Government, STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION REV. 16 (Spring 2013), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/design_led_innovation_in_
government [https://perma.cc/67RN-CVHM] (discussing both private industry and public
agencies adopting design thinking for public purposes); GLOB. CTR. FOR PUB. SERV.
EXCELLENCE, DESIGN THINKING FOR PUBLIC SERVICE EXCELLENCE (2014),
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/capacity-building/global-centre-forpublic-service-excellence/DesignThinking.html [https://perma.cc/M8D8-9BYA].
16
Design thinking has already been utilized to recommend changes to governmental systems
in Canada, Denmark, and other countries around the world. See JOERI VAN DEN STEENHOVEN
ET AL., SHIFTING PERSPECTIVES: REDESIGNING REGULATION FOR THE SHARING ECONOMY
(2016),
https://www.marsdd.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/MSL-Sharing-EconomyPublic-Design-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/62B9-9D35] (using design thinking principles to
rethink regulation for the City of Toronto); Bason, supra note 15, at 16 (“In Denmark, design
has already been applied in a wide range of public sector settings”); June Gwee, Redesigning
Employment Pass Application in Singapore, THIS IS DESIGN THINKING (June 15, 2015),
http://thisisdesignthinking.net/tag/government
[https://perma.cc/G398-P3N3]
(“Design
thinking can potentially transform the perception and meaning of public service.”).
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I. HOW THE BATTLE LINES WERE DRAWN17
The rulemaking procedures for the federal government and the state of
California have been in place since the mid-1940s.18 They were designed to
work well with a business models that are different from those used by many
platform companies today. For that reason, there is inherent tension between
existing rules and the models used by platform companies to offer services in
new ways.
A. The Culture of Regulation
Regulations have not always kept up in times of rapid change. 19 This
inability to adapt quickly can be traced to the increasing complexity of
regulation and the changing perspectives and theories concerning the goals of
regulation that drove that complexity throughout its history.20
The history of regulation in the United States is most often traced back
to the rules promulgated in the second half of the nineteenth century by the
17

We would like to thank all the participants in the ReWIRE Events hosted by UC Hastings
and the Office of Kamala Harris, California Attorney General in 2016. ReWIRE was attended
by both former and current regulators and entrepreneurs at new and established companies in
the platform economy, and was designed as a deep dive into the issues that are at the forefront
of this paper. In order to allow for full and frank discussions, we promised all participants we
would not quote or attribute anything directly, which we have not done. Nevertheless, many
of our arguments were inspired by their terrific insights and detailed discussions of the
impasse.
18
Cynthia Tripi, Administrative Law, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 729, 729 (1987); John G.
Clarkson, The History of the California Administrative Procedure Act, 15 HASTINGS L. J. 237,
247 (1964).
19
ANDREW LO, ADAPTIVE MARKETS: FINANCIAL EVOLUTION AT THE SPEED OF THOUGHT 372
(2017) (“The U.S. legal system is a working example of adaptive regulation. . . . [I]t
incrementally changes in response to societal needs and political pressure. However, it wasn’t
designed for periods of rapid change.”); see also Stephen J. Groseclose, Reinventing the
Regulatory Agenda: Conclusions on an Empirical Study of EPA’s Clean Air Act Rulemaking
Progress Projections, 53 MD. L. REV. 521, 522 (1994) (“Chronic regulatory delay and
unrealistic Agenda information are symptoms of complex problems in the regulatory
bureaucracy.”).
20
Cf. ROBERT BALDWIN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND
PRACTICE 66–67 (1999) (explaining that “[a]s the field of regulation has grown and matured,
so has the discussion regarding theory” and demonstrating the varying emphases of different
theories of regulation).

10
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federal government.21 At that time, public officials recognized that the
government had to protect merchants and farmers from the exorbitant rates
they were charged by railroad companies to ship goods across the country. 22
Eventually, Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887,23 which
created the first independent regulatory agency with the power to investigate
corporate activities.24
More laws and regulations followed in the next several decades as the
federal government exerted its power to control more industries.25 Additional
agencies and regulations followed throughout the first two-thirds of the
twentieth century. These included new consumer protection regulations in the
1900s and 1910s,26 as well as New Deal regulations in the 1930s.27
Environmental protections, civil rights, and reduction of poverty policies all
grew during the 1960s.28 At the same time, state governments were also

21

See Schiller, supra note 13, at 55–70. More recently, legal scholars and historians have
argued that there have been state and local rules since the United States was formed, and that
those rules were the beginning of regulation in the United States. See William J. Novak, A
Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL
INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 28–30 (including citations to works referenced)
(Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, eds., 2013).
22
See A Brief History of Administrative Government, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T,
http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/3461 [https://perma.cc/A7VG-PXQ7].
23
See Interstate Commerce Act (1887), OURDOCUMENTS.GOV, https://www.ourdocuments.go
v/doc.php?flash=false&doc=49 [https://perma.cc/7FRZ-NNAA].
24
See Andrew Glass, Congress Approves Interstate Commerce Act, Feb. 4, 1887, POLITICO
(Feb. 4, 2016 12:08 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/01/congress-approvesinterstate-commerce-act-feb-4-1887-218485 [https://perma.cc/6UKG-V8VH].
25
See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION 13 (2012)
(discussing the construction of the national administrative state in the United States).
26
See Our History, FED TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history
[https://perma.cc/92EL-5MZT] (noting that the FTC was created in 1914 and has the mission
to protect consumers and promote competition); Part I: The 1906 Food and Drugs Act and Its
Enforcement, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. [https://perma.cc/7UMP-7KXU],
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm054819.htm.
27
Cf. Martin Kelly, Top 10 New Deal Programs of the 1930s, THOUGHTCO
https://www.thoughtco.com/top-new-deal-programs-104687 [https://perma.cc/A55Q-UPPT].
28
See Mary O. Furner, From “State Interference” to the “Return of the Market”: The
Rhetoric of Economic Regulation from the Old Gilded Age to the New, in GOVERNMENT AND
MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION, 131 (Edward J. Balliesen & David A.
Moss eds., 2010).
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issuing rules in areas not covered by federal regulation.29 Following these
decades of rulemaking, the 1980s and 1990s saw a wave of deregulation.30
After the financial crisis of 2008, however, there have been calls for a return
to more regulation.31
Command-and-Control regulations are mandatory rules formulated by
government officials and imposed on a targeted industry.32 These sorts of
rules were seen as necessary because of the impact externalities had on the
efficiency of unfettered free markets.33 However, this authoritarian, top-down
method came under criticism in the 1970’s34—a period during which the
number and specificity of regulations exploded.35 Theorists began to
recognize that regulations did not always accomplish their goal of controlling
29

See Jonathan H. Adler, The Fable of Federal Regulation: Reconsidering the Federal Role
in Environmental Protection, 55 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 93, 97–98 (2004) (explaining
that before the Federal Government enacted any widespread environmental regulation, states
regulated businesses to protect clean air and water supplies).
30
See Edward Balleisen & David A. Moss, Introduction to GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS:
TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 1 (Edward Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2009).
For an analysis of the response of legal scholars to these developments, see Alice Armitage,
Gauguin, Darwin & Design Thinking: A Solution to the Impasse between Innovation and
Regulation
3–4
(Dec.
16,
2016)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2886101
[https://perma.cc/42VVM4RD].
31
Phil Angelides, How Did Our Financial System Become So Deregulated?, PBS:
FRONTLINE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/oral-history/financialcrisis/tags/deregulation/ [https://perma.cc/7KKZ-5SJV].
32
Wendell Pritchett, Types of Regulation, REG. REV. (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.theregrevie
w.org/2016/04/05/pritchett-types-of-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/HU9Y-NVJZ] (“Under
[command-and-control regulation], the regulatory agency sets forth methods, materials, and
the processes by which the regulated entity must operate.”).
33
See Balleisen & Moss, supra note 30, at 2 (noting that in the 1950s and 1960s, regulators
were understood to be on a “search and destroy mission, with market failure as the target”);
cf. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Government Failure vs. Market Failure: Principles of Regulation, in
GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 13, 15–16 (Edward
Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2009) (analyzing Adam Smith’s theory of free markets and
concluding that “the theory that markets, by themselves, lead to efficient outcomes has, in
short, no theoretical justifications”).
34
Furner, supra note 28, at 133–34.
35
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Why We Still Don’t Have Flying Cars, U.S.A. TODAY (May 12,
2016, 12:30 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/05/12/technologicalprogress-stagnation-regulatory-explosion-1970s-column/84225066/ [https://perma.cc/HRP3JTG7] (“1970 marks what scholars of administrative law (like me) call the ‘regulatory
explosion.’”).
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externalities,36 in part because of what would come to be known as the theory
of regulatory capture.
The term regulatory capture was the label given to the concepts first
described by George Stigler in the early 1970s.37 Stigler posited that “every
industry or occupation that has enough political power to utilize the state will
seek to control entry” and that “regulatory policy will often be so fashioned as
to retard the rate of growth of new firms.”38 In other words, the status quo is
protected by the regulations themselves, as it is difficult and often expensive
for new companies to comply with complicated rules.39
These theories of “government failure” led to a call for widespread
deregulation.40 These reforms, however, did not often change state and local

36

Cf. Balleisen & Moss, supra note 30, at 2–3 (“By the late 1970s, social scientists had begun
. . . showing increasing sensitivity to the possibility that even in the presence of market failure
policymakers could potentially do more harm than good in their attempts to cure market
ills.”); Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Interstate Commerce Commission:
The Tortuous Path From Regulation to Deregulation of America’s Infrastructure, 95 MARQ.
L. REV. 1151, 1152 (2012) (“[J]ust as market failure had given rise to economic regulation,
regulatory failure gave rise to deregulation.”).
37
Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 203, 203–
04 (2006); see generally George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 1, 3 (1971).
38
Stigler, supra note 37, at 5. Stigler’s original notion of regulatory capture has been
expanded to include more nuanced analyses of how capture can occur. See generally James
Kwak, Collateral Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE
71, 80–90 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014) (noting three mechanisms by
which regulated industry is able to shape regulators beliefs and actions: (1) identity, (2) status,
and (3) relationships).
39
See David A Moss & Daniel Carpenter, Conclusion: A Focus on Evidence and Prevention,
in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE 451, 451–52 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss
eds., 2014) (describing the original definition of regulatory capture as envisioning powerful
incumbent firms paying regulators to build barriers to entry).
40
See Marc Allen Eisner, Markets in the Shadow of the State: An Reappraisal of
Deregulation and Implications for Future Research, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS:
TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 512, 512–13 (Edward Balleisen & David A. Moss
eds., 2009) (describing how theories of regulatory capture and criticism of regulation in
general helped create a foundation for wide-ranging moves to deregulate markets).
Deregulation, however, did not always achieve the desired results. See Dempsey, supra note
36, at 1152. The worldwide financial crisis that began in 2008 resulted in a call for the return
of regulation to many industries, especially the banks. See Balleisen & Moss, supra note 30,
at 1.
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regulation, which is still regularly criticized for being subject to regulatory
capture.41
In addition to the lack of incentives for change created by regulatory
capture at the state and local level,42 other forces make new regulations
difficult to implement. First, the rulemaking process is lengthy and
cumbersome, and the process of revision even more so.43 Second, although an
agency may begin a rulemaking process on its own initiative, in practice, the
regulatory process is primarily reactive. Regulators tend to wait for a statutory
mandate, a suggestion from other government official or agency, or a petition
from an outside person before initiating the process to change an existing rule
or write a new one.44
The result is that, even now, in the digital age, the state and local
rulemaking process is slow and deliberative, waiting for changes in the
marketplace to create demand for regulatory changes.45 For example, San
41

See John Cassidy, Battle of the Bike Lanes, NEW YORKER (Mar. 8, 2011),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/battle-of-the-bike-lanes
[https://perma.cc/Y54Y-466G]; cf. Larry Downes, Lessons from Uber: Why Innovation and
Regulation Don’t Mix, FORBES (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrydownes/201
3/02/06/lessons-from-uber-why-innovation-and-regulation-dont-mix/ [https://perma.cc/336TTKX9] (describing the author’s bad experience using a taxi and explaining that, at the time,
“Uber [could not] operate in Miami, for example, where existing laws were clearly drafted to
protect taxicabs from competition even from other licensed services”).
42
See, e.g., Downes, supra note 41 (outlining lack of motivation for taxi drivers to adopt
improvements to the service they offered).
43
Lynn E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive Regulation, and the
Problem of Rulemaking Ruts, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1710 (2008) (“revision of existing rules
may be even more likely to fall victim to the factors responsible for the ossification of initial
rulemaking”); cf. Cal. St. Senate Republican Caucus, Briefing Report: The Riveting
Regulatory Process: A Study in Bureaucracy, CSSRC.US (Mar. 13, 2013),
http://cssrc.us/content/briefing-report-riveting-regulatory-process-study-bureaucracy
[https://perma.cc/F35S-HKY9] (outlining the steps necessary to propose a new rule and
describing a process that will take months or years to complete).
44
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59,
61 (1995) (“[A]gencies rarely amend rules because the amendment process is as daunting as
the process of promulgating a rule.”); cf. Ronald M. Levin, A Blackletter Statement of Federal
Administrative Law, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 30–36 (2002) (outlining the federal rulemaking
process). The California process is similarly cumbersome and reactive. See CAL. OFFICE
ADMIN. LAW, The Rulemaking Process, http://www.cfb.ca.gov/laws_regs/flowchart.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RK3L-FVPL].
45
For an example of one state’s rulemaking process, see Flowchart of Public Rulemaking
Process
in
California,
OFFICE
ADMIN.
L.
https://www.oal.ca.gov/wp-
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Francisco had a law on the books from the 1980s that banned all short-term
rentals.46 Airbnb hosts provided short-term rentals in the city for six years
before the city changed that law. One member of the Board of Supervisors
said that he had been trying for two years to write new rules to govern these
rentals before changes were finally made in 2014.47 Similarly, taxi companies
are regulated across the country by the cities in which they operate. 48 The
result was an industry that had not kept up with consumer demand or
technological change and thus was ripe for disruption.49 Additionally, the
mechanisms available to regulators to enforce the rules were limited to
punitive tools designed to control industry participants with traditional
business plans.50
Consequently, the industries that the platform-economy companies set
out to disrupt in the first decade of the twentieth century were subject to a
regulatory process that was slow, deliberative, and reactive. While existing
regulations provided a way for the public to participate, these regulations were
content/uploads/sites/28/2017/05/Regular-Rulemaking-Flowchart_FINAL_June-2014-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E55R-CQBA] (describing at least 8 steps required to write and implement a
California state regulation, including at least one and possibly two 45-day comment periods).
46
Bigad Shaban, Jeremy Carroll & Kevin Nious, Thousands Violate SF Housing Laws Using
Airbnb, Few Face Penalties, NBC BAY AREA (May 19, 2016), http://www.nbcbayarea.com/in
vestigations/Bay-Legal-Thousands-violate-SF-housing-laws-few-face-penalties380218621.html [https://perma.cc/96AG-UP4N].
47
See David Chiu, San Francisco’s Short-Term Rental Solution, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 1,
2014),
https://techcrunch.com/2014/11/01/san-franciscos-short-term-rental-solution/
[https://perma.cc/XLF6-U8FP] (stating that after two-and-a-half years, the mayor of San
Francisco signed a law the author wrote that will for the first time regulate short-term rentals
in San Francisco).
48
See Bruce Schaller, Entry Controls in Taxi Regulation: Implications of US and Canadian
Experience for Taxi Regulation and Deregulation, 14 TRANSPORT POL’Y 490, 490–506
(2007) (analyzing taxi regulations in 43 North American cities, including 32 of the 50 largest
taxi regulatory systems in North America as measured by the number of taxicabs). The taxi
industry across the country is often cited as a prime example of regulatory capture in which
the rules themselves act as a barrier to entry and so cushion incumbents from market forces.
See MICHAEL FARREN, CHRISTOPHER KOOPMAN, & MATTHEW MITCHELL, RETHINKING TAXI
REGULATIONS:
THE CASE FOR FUNDAMENTAL REFORM 7–8 (July 2016),
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Farren_Taxi_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F8Z9FCWM].
49
See Downes, supra note 41.
50
Cf. Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 53 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 147, 184–94 (2016) (describing the limited mechanisms, mostly in the form of
punitive tools, available to regulators).
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difficult to access or understand substantively and procedurally, and were
focused on past ways of doing business.51 There was no incentive for
regulators to stay on top of changes in the industry they regulated, nor to make
amendments to existing rules. In this way, the regulators of the hotel and taxi
industries operated in a bureaucratic culture in which change was not
welcomed and happened slowly, if at all.
B. The Culture of Platform Companies
Silicon Valley culture, to which entrepreneurs all over the world pay
attention, is based on a few long-standing principles. One is the belief that a
successful startup should be built the “lean startup” way.52 Proponents of this
method favor experimentation instead of elaborate planning, customer input
over intuition, and designing in the open instead of in “stealth mode.”53 The
second principle is building products or services using “agile development”: a
model that incorporates feedback from users to quickly redesign and relaunch
their innovation.54 As a result, entrepreneurs are used to being nimble, quickly
51

Over-Regulated America: The Home of Laissez-Faire is Being Suffocated by Excessive and
Badly Written Regulation, ECONOMIST (Feb. 18, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/215
47789 [https://perma.cc/FE7S-ZBSX].
52
Tim Raynor, Startups and the Hacker Way: The (Counter-) Cultural History of Lean
Method, MEDIUM (Mar. 20, 2016), https://medium.com/@timrayner01/startups-and-thehacker-way-on-the-counter-cultural-history-of-lean-method-ce7e9b736ed1
[https://perma.cc/WC3X-HUAL] (lean startup methods, along with design thinking and agile
development, are the basis of hacker culture, which has been adopted by the Silicon Valley
innovation culture); see Steve Blank, Why the Lean Startup Changes Everything, HARV. BUS.
REV.
(May
2013),
https://hbr.org/2013/05/why-the-lean-start-up-changes-everything
[https://perma.cc/Q72U-X3K6] (“On the basis of what I’ve seen at hundreds of start-ups, at
programs that teach lean principles, and at established companies that practice them, I can
make a more important claim: Using lean methods across a portfolio of start-ups will result in
fewer failures than using traditional methods.”); see generally ERIC RIES, THE LEAN STARTUP:
HOW TODAY’S ENTREPRENEURS USE CONTINUOUS INNOVATION TO CREATE RADICALLY
SUCCESSFUL BUSINESSES (2011) (describing the lean-startup method of growing a business).
53
Blank, supra note 52.
54
See Blank, supra note 52 (“[A]gile development eliminates wasted time and resources by
developing the product iteratively and incrementally. It’s the process by which start-ups create
the minimum viable products they test.”). The team then uses the consumers’ feedback on the
Minimum Viable Product to create successive versions of the product or service. Id. In each
cycle, user feedback is quickly adopted and a new version is released. Id. The agile method
differs from the traditional waterfall model. See Jim Bowes, Agile vs. Waterfall: Comparing
Project Management Methods, MANIFESTO (July 17, 2014), https://manifesto.co.uk/agile-vs-
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addressing consumers’ issues that arise with a particular version of their
product, or “pivoting” to a new product when feedback indicates that the
appeal of their current minimum viable product is limited.
Following the lean-startup method and the agile-development process,
entrepreneurs have embraced a culture of disruption, often based on the
philosophy of “ask forgiveness, not permission.”55 Although this principle
was not designed to foster rule breaking, entrepreneurs have applied this
attitude toward existing rules and laws.56
C. The Clash of Two Very Different Cultures
New technologies allow innovators to engage with prospective users
early in the creative process to receive feedback while the product or service
is still in development. Therefore, entrepreneurs are used to welcoming
change; new feedback continually informs their understanding of user needs
and preferences.57 State and federal regulatory processes, however, tend to be

waterfall-comparing-project-management-methodologies/ [https://perma.cc/XA97-YRMU].
The waterfall method is a process in which each a product moves linearly through each phase
of its life cycle from design to implementation. See id. Then, the product is tested at the final
stage of execution of the design. See id. Only after testing is complete is the product or service
released to consumers. See id.
55
See Bill Murphy, Jr., Want to Succeed in Life? Ask for Forgiveness, Not Permission, INC
(Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.inc.com/bill-murphy-jr/9-words-to-live-by-its-always-better-tobeg-forgiveness-than-ask-permission.html [https://perma.cc/4BNH-ZH8S] (“[I]t’s a popular
mantra now, among high-performing entrepreneurs.”); Neil Irwin, For Start-Ups Looking to
Disrupt Regulated Industries, the New Strategy Is: Ask Forgiveness, Not Permission, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/upshot/for-start-ups-looking-todisrupt-regulated-industries-the-new-strategy-is-ask-forgiveness-not-permission.html
[https://nyti.ms/2jfudyg].
56
See Mike Bishop, Breaking the Law—How Many Great Entrepreneurs Get Their Start,
LINKEDIN (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/breaking-law-how-many-greatentrepreneurs-get-start-mike-bishop-jd/ [https://perma.cc/5UMC-T4WH]; see also Aarti
Shahani, As Uber Expands, It Asks Cities for Forgiveness Instead of Permission, NPR (Dec.
26, 2014), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/12/26/373087290/as-uberexpands-it-asks-cities-for-forgivness-instead-of-permission [https://perma.cc/3D4D-KAWF]
57
See Ted Ladd, The Limits of the Lean Startup Method, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 2016),
https://hbr.org/2016/03/the-limits-of-the-lean-startup-method [https://perma.cc/B39P-6EW6]
(acknowledging the popularity of Eric Ries’ lean startup method); Steve Lohr, The Rise of the
Fleet-Footed Startup, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/25/busi
ness/25unboxed.html?dbk [https://nyti.ms/2rNjH0a] (describing Eric Ries’ method: “the start-
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slow and deliberative, involving years of preliminary fact finding activities,
rulemaking notices, public hearings, proposed rules, and comment periods
before new rules are able to be promulgated.58
Conceptually, the ways in which platform companies' attitudes of
disruption clash with traditional regulatory systems can be separated into three
categories: (1) Nimble Methods versus Slow Deliberative Methods, (2) New
Business Models versus Old Rules, and (3) Many Resources versus Few
Resources. Following this roadmap, Part II of this article will demonstrate
how the clash of culture played out in the regulatory battles of the two largest
platform companies: Uber and Airbnb.
1. Nimble Methods Versus Slow Deliberative Methods
Entrepreneurs in the platform economy often base their businesses on
the agile development process.59 Their reliance on nimble processes makes it
difficult for innovators to understand and respect the drawn-out process of
regulation.60 This lack of respect can make entrepreneurs disinclined to follow
up should continually experiment by tweaking its offering, seeing how the market responds
and changing the product accordingly.”).
58
Cf. Flowchart of Public Rulemaking Process in California, supra note 45 (describing at
least eight steps required to write and implement a California state regulation, including at
least one and possibly two forty-five-day comment periods).
59
See, e.g., John Glover, Uber and Airbnb: The Importance of Agile Working in 2015,
KAHOOTZ (June 3, 2015), http://cloud-collaboration.kahootz.com/uber-and-airbnb-theimportance-of-agile-working-in-2015 [https://perma.cc/7L8Z-HS5U] (describing how Uber,
Airbnb, Alibaba and Facebook all have broken away from traditional business models and
used agile development methods to become successful).
60
Cf. Ingrid Lunden, Uber’s Travis Kalanick on Regulators: You Have to Grit Your Teeth, Be
a Warrior, or Do Something Less Disruptive, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 12, 2012),
https://techcrunch.com/2012/09/12/ubers-travis-kalanick-on-regulators-you-have-to-grit-yourteeth-be-a-warrior-or-do-something-less-disruptive/
[https://perma.cc/ZK2W-CMS9]
(mentioning the length of the decision-making process a one of three ways that regulators get
things wrong when regulating innovative companies); Matt McFarland, America’s Clumsy
Regulation of Drones Stirs Up Frustration, Confusion, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2010),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2014/12/09/americas-clumsyregulation-of-drones-stirs-up-frustration-confusion/
[https://perma.cc/X8TV-TCVH]
(describing a drone operator as frustrated by regulators that don’t keep up with a rapidly
developing field); Howard Beales, et al., Government Regulation: The Good, the Bad, & the
Ugly, REG. TRANSPARENCY PROJECT FEDERALIST SOC. (June 12, 2017),
https://regproject.org/paper/government-regulation-the-good-the-bad-the-ugly/
[https://perma.cc/38XE-BQF7] (“[U]nlike ecosystems and interactions in non-government
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the existing rules.61 Ironically, however, it is specifically what entrepreneurs
disrespect about regulation, the existence of regulatory capture and the slow
deliberative methods of regulators, that fosters the consumer demand or “pain
points” that an innovative company needs to succeed.62

spheres, where individuals and organizations are constantly learning from past experience and
updating their behavior accordingly, the regulatory sphere has no feedback loop.”).
61
See Mike Isaac, How Uber Deceives the Authorities Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/technology/uber-greyball-program-evadeauthorities.html [https://nyti.ms/2lngDck] (noting that “Uber has long flouted laws and
regulations to gain an edge”). Some academics have adopted the argument that regulations
should not apply to startups. See Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, E-Commerce, Entrepreneurship
and the Law: Reassessing a Relationship, in THE EMERGENCE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND
POLICY: GOVERNANCE, STARTUPS AND GROWTH 199 (David M. Hart, ed., 2003) (writing that
for entrepreneurial companies, “no regulation seems the best of all options”); Arun
Sundararajan, Why the Government Doesn’t Need to Regulate the Sharing Economy, WIRED
(Oct.
22,
2010),
https://www.wired.com/2012/10/from-airbnb-to-coursera-why-thegovernment-shouldnt-regulate-the-sharing-economy/ [https://perma.cc/V249-ZVSQ] (arguing
that rating systems on platforms replace the need for regulation).
62
Jeffrey Carter, What’s a Pain Point?, POINTS AND FIGURES (Apr. 27, 2012),
http://pointsandfigures.com/2012/04/27/whats-a-pain-point/ [https://perma.cc/7CBZ-HLR5]
(stating that “a pain point is a problem, real or perceived. Entrepreneurs create opportunities
for themselves by creating solutions to those pain points. Solutions create value for
everyone.”). The larger the pain point, the more consumers will be benefited by the solution.
For example, New York has long restricted the number of medallions for taxi drivers. See
Lawrence Van Gelder, Medallion Limits Stem from the 30s, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 1996),
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/11/nyregion/medallion-limits-stem-from-the-30-s.html
[https://nyti.ms/2jhBePl]. Even in 2016, there were only 13,347 medallions. See N.Y. CITY
TAXI AND LIMOUSINE COMM’N, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 2 http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downl
oads/pdf/annual_report_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/LS44-VGTW]. By early 2017, cars driven
for Uber and Lyft exceeded the number of New York City yellow cabs by 4 to 1. Rachel
Sugar, Uber and Lyft Cars Now Outnumber Yellow Cabs in NYC 4 to 1, CURBED (Jan. 17,
2017),
https://ny.curbed.com/2017/1/17/14296892/yellow-taxi-nyc-uber-lyft-via-numbers
[https://perma.cc/MK3M-C243]. Cf. Jordan Chittley, Taxi Industry Losing War to Uber
Because of Customer Service, Not Technology, GLOBE & MAIL
(Dec. 9, 2015),
https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/globe-drive/culture/commentary/taxi-industry-losing-warto-uber-because-of-customer-service-nottechnology/article27656590/?ref=http://www.theglobeandmail.com&
[https://perma.cc/BK4A-JKRK] (noting that Uber and other ridesharing companies took
advantage of this situation by increasing the availability of rides as well as creating ondemand access to their services).

2017

GEORGETOWN LAW TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

19

2. New Business Models versus Old Rules
While previously it has been possible to find a shared ride or a
vacation home to rent on community bulletin boards or local newsletters,
platform companies have greatly expanded the number of these transactions
and monetized them by taking a fee when a transaction results between users
and providers on their platform.63 New technologies allow the founders of
platform companies to directly connect the users of services to those who can
provide them. As a result, platform companies do not own assets fundamental
to the services they provide.64
Existing regulations for taxi companies and hotels were written
predominantly when taxi companies and hotels owned the cars and rooms,
respectively, that they provided. The regulations therefore include rules about
the condition, hygiene, and use of those assets.65 Because platform companies
do not own these fundamental assets, founders of these companies argue that
the regulations written for incumbent companies do not apply to them.66 This
argument enables platform companies to continue to operate after regulators
63

See Martin Kenney & John Zysman, The Rise of the Platform Economy, 32 ISSUES SCI. &
TECH.
3
(2016)
http://issues.org/32-3/the-rise-of-the-platform-economy/
[https://perma.cc/F6G9-26EZ] (noting that Uber, Airbnb, and Facebook are not based on
“sharing”; rather, they monetize human effort and consumer assets). One characteristic of
making these connections in the traditional way was that the user often knew the provider or
they were members of the same community and were incentivized to treat each other fairly to
preserve their reputations in the community. The platform companies and their supporters
argue that they have replicated this trust through their ratings systems. See Arun
Sundararajan, supra note 61 (“In the sharing economy, reputation serves as the digital
institution that protects buyers and prevents the market failure that economists and policy
makers worry about.”) (emphasis added); but see Armitage, supra note 30, at 29–31 (ratings
systems do not function effectively to protect consumers).
64
Geoffrey A. Fowler & Ted Mann, Taxi Apps Face Bumpy Road, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 28,
2012),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204005004578082630070372690
(“Uber CEO Travis Kalanick says regulators misunderstand his company because, unlike cab
or limo companies, Uber doesn’t own cars or employ drivers.”).
65
See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 25, §§ 32–46 (2017) (hotel owners are legally required to
maintain the safety and cleanliness of their properties at all times); New York, N.Y., Rules of
New York City. ch 35. §§ 51–83 (legal requirements for taxicab and limousine safety in New
York City).
66
See Lunden, supra note 60 (stating that regulators put the brakes on in cases where they
haven’t actually established rules and quoting Travis Kalanick saying that “[a] regulator is
supposed to create and enforce a standard. If they don’t have a standard, that doesn’t make it
illegal.”).
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attempt to ban their operations. Being able to argue that regulations do not
apply to them is critical to the survival of these innovative companies.67
Platform companies grow quickly in part because, if they have
successfully solved a major “pain point” for consumers, many people want to
use their services. The large user base that results from this demand provides
these companies with leverage over regulators in three powerful ways. First,
users can be easily mobilized to create a groundswell of public opposition if
regulators threaten to restrict the availability of their services.68 Second,
millions of users indicate that the business has traction, which attracts
additional investments from venture capitalists. With these additional funds,
platform companies can lobby the government, afford expensive litigation,
and finance campaigns to influence public opinion.69 Third, platform
technology enables companies to amass large amounts of data. This data could
be extremely useful to city and state officials as they plan for the future and

67

Platform companies that have attempted to comply with regulators from the time they
launch claim they have been put out of business by the process. See Susie Cagle, How a
Startup That Wouldn’t Break the Rules Was Forced to Fail, PAC. STANDARD MAG. (Jan. 27,
2015),
https://psmag.com/how-a-start-up-that-wouldn-t-break-the-rules-was-forced-to-fail657d60b71ef0#.7flvajjmb [https://perma.cc/Q6GV-KUK7].
68
See Derek Thompson, How Uber’s Taxi App is Changing Cities, ATLANTIC (Nov. 23,
2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/11/how-ubers-taxi-app-is-changingcities/281451/ [https://perma.cc/YDY9-73RU] (describing a late-night social media campaign
by Uber to defeat a proposed Congressional amendment). Airbnb also employed this strategy
to defeat Proposition F in San Francisco in 2015. See Carolyn Said, Prop. F: S.F. Voters
Reject Measure to Restrict Airbnb Rentals, S.F. GATE (Nov. 4, 2015),
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Prop-F-Measure-to-restrict-Airbnb-rentals6609176.php [https://perma.cc/JRH6-BSVX].
69
In 2016, Airbnb’s revenue was estimated at nearly $1.7 billion and the company was valued
at $30 billion. See Tessa Love, Airbnb’s Revenue Soars 89 Percent, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Sept. 1,
2016),
http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2016/09/01/airbnbs-revenue-soarscompared-to-hotels.html [https://perma.cc/U4WW-E3D9]. During the first half of 2015,
Uber’s revenue exceeded $650 million. Brian Solomon, Leaked: Uber’s Financials Show
Huge
Growth,
Even
Bigger
Losses,
FORBES
(Jan.
12,
2016),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2016/01/12/leaked-ubers-financials-show-hugegrowth-even-bigger-losses/#65257b3d5c99 [https://perma.cc/ST39-MJTR]. Because Uber’s
revenue model suggested traction, even though the company had lost money in 2015, Uber
was valued at $62.5 billion in a 2016 funding round. See Eric Newcomer & Glen Carey, Uber
Receives $3.5 Billion Investment from Saudi Wealth Fund, BLOOMBERG (June 1, 2016),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-01/uber-receives-3-5-billion-investmentfrom-saudi-wealth-fund [https://perma.cc/Q2JQ-9LQJ].
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assess the impact of the platform companies on their jurisdictions.70
Ownership of this data provides companies with a valuable bargaining chip
when negotiating with local officials.
Traditional regulations can be difficult to apply to the new business
models of the platform economy companies for yet another reason. Most rules
are written for commercial enterprises and are based on two assumptions
about the targeted businesses: first, they will possess a certain level of
knowledge and sophistication about regulations and the regulatory process;
and second, they will have the resources necessary to comply with complex
regulations. The business model of the platform companies, however, permits
individuals to earn income from activities previously available only to
employees.71 One of the founders of Airbnb, Brian Chesky, acknowledged
this point: “There were laws created for businesses, and there were laws for
people. What the sharing economy did was create a third category: people as
businesses.”72 The sorts of rules that are appropriate for business entities may
not be appropriate for people who are providing the service as individuals
using their personally-owned assets. These individuals often don't have much
knowledge of the rules that apply to them now that they are, according to
regulators, a commercial operation.73
70

See STONE, supra note 3, at 121 (noting how Uber had more access to city-wide traffic and
transit data than any other company). See also Carolyn Said, Airbnb, HomeAway Settle SF
Suit, Agree to Register All Hosts, SFGATE (May 1, 2017, 7:17 PM),
http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Airbnb-settles-SF-suit-agrees-to-register-all11112109.php (mentioning how vital data was to Airbnb’s cease-fire with San Francisco)
[https://perma.cc/TB3M-RR27].
71
Platform companies do not follow the traditional relationship between employer and
employee. Instead, those who provide services on behalf of the companies, e.g., Uber drivers
and Airbnb renters, are classified as independent contractors. This very important discussion
is, however, outside the scope of this essay. For an examination of the issues, see generally
Benjamin Means & Joseph Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1511
(2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2663350
[https://perma.cc/VE5H-SMQ3]; see also Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to
Uber: Defining Employment in the Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. Rev. 1673 (Apr. 13, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2761577
[https://perma.cc/URX2JUQR].
72
See Andy Kessler, Brian Chesky: The ‘Sharing Economy’ and Its Enemies, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 17, 2014, 7:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304049704579321
001856708992.
73
There is evidence that some property owners are using Airbnb’s platform to rent out
multiple units, thereby operating true commercial enterprises. See, e.g., Chabeli Herrera,

22

GEORGETOWN LAW TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

Vol 2:1

In sum, the new business models of platform companies cause
struggles with regulators in three ways: first, they are able to argue plausibly
that traditional regulations do not apply and thus continue to operate in the
face of bans and prohibitive fees; second, they are able to quickly amass large
consumer bases that supply additional pressure on regulators; and third, the
actual provider of the commercial service, the owner of the asset used to
supply the service is often an unsophisticated micro-entrepreneur. Thus it is
not a simple matter for regulators to know the best ways to write rules that
govern these innovative companies. For all these reasons, in a traditional
regulatory system, successful platform companies have become “too big to
regulate.”74

Airbnb and Hoteliers Battle Over Role, Regulations for Home-Sharing in Miami, MIAMI
HERALD
(May
25,
2016),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/tourismcruises/article79673612.html [https://perma.cc/VMD9-8R32] (“Airbnb operators who offer
multiple units on the online service drove 62 percent of Airbnb’s regional revenue—about
$76 million.”). Any regulations formulated to apply to Airbnb hosts should attempt to
distinguish between true home-sharing hosts and property owners attempting to run
commercial enterprises. There have also been complaints that fleet operators are using Uber’s
platform to run a commercial ride-sharing business. See Ashleigh Davis, How Your Young
Uber Driver Affords Such a Nice Car: Meet the People Renting Out Fleets of Cars to Drivers
on
the
Ride
Sharing
App,
DAILY
MAIL
(Apr.
22,
2016),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3553498/Meet-people-renting-fleets-cars-Uberdrivers-ride-sharing-app.html [https://perma.cc/Y5XD-3B78].
74
This term was used in an op-ed in the New York Times in 2014 to complain that the banks,
which were “too big to fail” in 2008 and hence bailed out by the government, were being
treated as “too big to regulate” six years later by the Federal Reserve as it once again refused
to apply the stricter capital and leverage requirements included in the Dodd-Frank financial
reform bill passed by Congress as part of the bail-out agreement. The Editorial Board, Too
Big to Regulate, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/10/opinion/su
nday/too-big-to-regulate.html [https://nyti.ms/2jGyZQK]. It seems that Kalanick himself was
aware of the concept of developing a product that has become too big to regulate. Cf.
Christine
Laogoria-Chafkin,
Resistance
is
Futile,
INC
(July–Aug.
2013),
https://www.inc.com/magazine/201307/christine-lagorio/uber-the-car-service-explosivegrowth.html [https://perma.cc/ZK5T-X55L] (quoting Travis Kalanick) (“Uber riders are the
most affluent, influential people in their cities. When we get to a critical mass, it becomes
impossible to shut us down.”).
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3. Access to Resources versus Limited Resources
Some platform-economy companies have the benefit of receiving
substantial funding from private investors.75 With this level of funding,
platform companies can engage in costly battles with regulators by utilizing
lobbyists to influence state and municipal officials, and by employing lawyers
to defend against court actions.76
The regulators who challenge these companies often have limited
resources. In recent battles, most of these regulators have been state and
municipal—rather than federal—authorities.77 As compared to federal
regulators, these local officials do not have the staff or resources to create or
oversee the extensive regulations that would be needed to effectively control
the platform-economy companies.78 Moreover, sometimes the platformeconomy companies control the data needed to enforce regulations and
decline to share this data with regulators.79
75

See Chris Meyers, Decoding Uber’s Proposed $50B Valuation, FORBES (May 13, 2015),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrismyers/2015/05/13/decoding-ubers-50-billion-valuationand-what-it-means-for-you/#57a5f2ee785a [https://perma.cc/TM3B-8FL6] (noting that in
May 2015, Uber was the “world’s most highly capitalized startup”). In October 2017, Uber
was valued at $69 billion. See Alexei Oreskovic, Uber will IPO by 2019 and let Softbank Buy
a Huge Stake, Following a Big Board Meeting, BUS. INSIDER, (Oct. 3, 2017),
http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-board-says-it-approved-equality-among-shareholdersand-to-move-forward-with-softbank-deal-2017-10?r=UK&IR=T
[https://perma.cc/8Q6N4DTG]. In addition, some of the founders had funds of their own from prior successful
startups they had sold. See STONE, supra note 3, at 119 (discussing Travis Kalanick’s payout
from selling a business he founded, Red Swoosh).
76
See, e.g., Rosalind Helderman, Uber Pressures Regulators by Mobilizing Riders and Hiring
Vast
Lobbying
Network,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
13,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/uber-pressures-regulators-by-mobilizing-ridersand-hiring-vast-lobbying-network/2014/12/13/3f4395c6-7f2a-11e4-9f3895a187e4c1f7_story.html [https://perma.cc/A4FW-DTMJ].
77
The industries in which most platform companies operate, such as the taxi and hotel
industries, have traditionally been regulated by the jurisdiction in which they operate, and not
by federal agencies. See Eric Posner, Why Uber Should—and Will—Be Regulated, SLATE
(Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2015/01/
uber_surge_pricing_federal_regulation_over_taxis_and_car_ride_services.html
[https://perma.cc/V6TN-2QDF].
78
For a list of the changes that would be needed to make existing regulations work with
platform companies’ business models, see Miller, supra note 50.
79
See Annie Karni, Uber Loses TLC Appeal to Turn Over Trip Data, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan.
22, 2015), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/uber-loses-tlc-deal-turn-trip-data-
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D. Conclusion
For all of the reasons discussed above, attempts to regulate platform
companies have not gone smoothly. Much of the tension between the
entrepreneurs and the regulators stems from the platform companies’
innovative business models that are not obviously within the scope of
traditional regulations. Some of the tension also stems from a clash of
cultures: the iterative, fast-paced world of disruption does not mesh easily
with the deliberative, slow-moving process of traditional rulemaking. In Part
II, we will describe real-life examples of this tension as we delve into the
details of the struggles of California and New York authorities to regulate
Uber and Airbnb.

II. REACTIVE REGULATORS AND UNCOOPERATIVE COMPANIES
In the first two decades of the twenty-first century, technological
innovation has allowed many nascent companies to provide traditional
services like transportation and lodging to customers in new ways. 80 As
article-1.2087718 [https://perma.cc/J6BH-LDEV]; Murray Cox & Tom Slee, How Airbnb’s
Data Hid the Facts in New York City, INSIDE AIRBNB (Feb. 10, 2016),
http://insideairbnb.com/how-airbnb-hid-the-facts-in-nyc/ (detailing how Airbnb removed
hundreds of listings by hosts with multiple properties in New York before providing data to
NY officials) [https://perma.cc/KJ2T-Q75L]. Even when complying with regulations, Uber
and Airbnb do not provide fine-grained information to regulators with respect to tax collection
and background checks. See Emily Badger, What Happens When Uber and Airbnb Become
Their
Own
Regulators,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
4,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/02/04/what-happens-when-uber-andairbnb-become-their-own-regulators/ [https://perma.cc/R64Q-NG2Z]; see also Kia
Kokalitcheva, Most San Francisco Airbnb Hosts Shirk Regulations, Report Finds, FORTUNE
(Apr. 8, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/08/airbnb-hosts-not-compliant-san-francisco/
[https://perma.cc/6PHS-ULLP]; Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber Fined $7.6 Million in California
for
Failure
to
Report
Driver
Data,
VERGE
(Jan.
14,
2016),
http://www.theverge.com/2016/1/14/10772412/uber-fine-california-utility-driver-data
[https://perma.cc/7H32-ED3D].
80
The platform economy goes beyond Uber and Airbnb, with other companies providing
services such as car sharing, valet parking, and food delivery. Founded in 2014, Getaround is
a car-sharing service that aims to decrease car ownership in cities. See Carolyn Said, City
CarShare Hands Over On-Demand Auto Rentals to Getaround, S.F. CHRONICLE (Nov. 10,
2016),
http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/City-CarShare-hands-over-on-demandauto-rentals-10605179.php [https://perma.cc/79QY-PUSR] (quoting Sam Zaid, Getaround
CEO: “We see a true long-term shift in how consumers will access transportation in the
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established in Part I, there are inherent cultural and contextual reasons for
regulators and platform companies to clash.81 A command-type regulatory
system has few, if any, mechanisms to resolve or ameliorate the tensions. 82 A
regulator’s toolkit primarily provides punitive options, such as fines and
cease-and-desist orders, to enforce regulations.83
The struggle between platform companies and regulators often begins
with a standard reactive response from the regulators after the company has
already begun operating in the city. This pattern is borne out in the Uber and
the Airbnb sagas in both San Francisco and New York. In neither city did
regulators reach out with an offer of collaboration or an attempt to call a
company in for discussions. Instead regulators drew a line in the sand by
future, moving away from ownership toward access”). Luxe Valet takes those who are
hesitant to drive in cities due to lack of parking, and connects them with on-demand valets.
See Sarah Tilton, San Francisco Entrepreneur Aims to Make Parking ‘a Delight’ with OnDemand Valet, FORBES (Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahtilton/2014/10/23/
san-francisco-entrepreneur-aims-to-make-parking-a-delight-with-on-demandvalet/#62ae7ae04407 [https://perma.cc/BZB4-D7JX]. Postmates provides both take-out food
and grocery-store delivery to busy city dwellers. See Ryan Lawler, On-Demand Delivery
Startup Postmates Raises $16 Million from Spark Capital, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 18, 2014),
https://techcrunch.com/2014/02/18/postmates-16m-spark-capital/
[https://perma.cc/7KJFSUQ8].
81
Although beyond the scope of this article, these clashes are likely with any new company
utilizing agile development models to produce products quickly and bring them to market
with an unproven beta model. Pressure is already mounting on regulators to provide
legislative guidelines and limits to autonomous car companies as the technology becomes
more and more accessible for consumers. Mercedes Benz, for example, has pledged to have a
fully autonomous car available for the market by 2021. See Nathan Bomey & Thomas
Zambito, Regulators Scramble to Stay Ahead of Self-Driving Cars, USA TODAY (June 25,
2017),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2017/06/25/regulators-scramble-stayahead-self-driving-cars/100963150/ [https://perma.cc/52EC-FRLM].
82
Samuel Stayley, Taxi Regulation and the Failures of Progressivism, FOUND. ECON. EDU.
(Jan. 4, 2012), https://fee.org/articles/taxi-regulation-and-the-failures-of-progressivism/
[https://perma.cc/7R2H-EKYE] (detailing the specificity and commands of taxi regulation:
“Taxi regulations and codes fix prices by law, mandate the way fares are collected (meters),
dictate hours of operation (24-hour dispatch service), regulate financial operations (by
requiring financial reporting), promote public safety (vehicle inspections), set standards for
language fluency and driver competence (tests), and include dozens of other regulations.”).
83
CHRISTOPHER CARRINGAN & ELISE HARRINGTON, CHOICES IN REGULATORY PROGRAM
DESIGN AND ENFORCEMENT 28–46 (2015), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/4706carriganharrington-ppr-researchpaper062015pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2FZ-4WRT] (detailing
different kinds of regulation and enforcement and describing two for command regulations:
discretionary punishment and nondiscretionary punishment).
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issuing cease-and-desist letters or enacting restrictive laws.84 Uber and
Airbnb, both bolstered by the huge consumer demand for their innovative
services,85 fought back.86 As the following sections will demonstrate, the
resulting disputes created escalating costs and negative publicity for both
sides.87 The battle began, however, with harsh and punitive responses from
regulators that forced the young companies to adopt equally combative
measures to keep the regulators at bay.

84

See Lora Kolodny, UberCab Ordered to Cease And Desist, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 24, 2010),
https://techcrunch.com/2010/10/24/ubercab-ordered-to-cease-and-desist/
[https://perma.cc/8D7X-HZRD]; Jessica Dailey, An Introduction to New York’s Short Term
Rental Laws, CURBED N.Y.C. (Mar. 25, 2013), https://ny.curbed.com/2013/3/25/10260752
[perma.cc/AN2L-MTFN] (2011 New York state law prohibits rentals of less than 30 days
unless family member present or unit zoned as hotel or hostel); see also Joshua D. Wright,
Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at Clemson University: Regulation in High-Tech
Markets: Public Choice, Regulatory Capture, and the FTC (Apr. 2, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/634631/150402clemson.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VFU6-CD6G] (in the taxi industry, “regulators have responded by doubling
down on competition-reducing regulations rather than by allowing new disruptive competition
to flourish”).
85
See Alexis C. Madrigal, The Rise of the One-Room Hotel, ATLANTIC (Nov. 11, 2010),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/11/the-rise-of-the-one-roomhotel/66439/ [https://perma.cc/NC3W-XAZD] (noting that Airbnb reported booking 560,000
rooms in the six months prior to the article); see also Michael Arrington, Huge Vote of
Confidence: Uber Raises $11 Million From Benchmark Capital, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 14,
2011), https://techcrunch.com/2011/02/14/huge-vote-of-confidence-uber-raises-11-millionfrom-benchmark-capital/ [https://perma.cc/C9MK-8GV4] (noting that between summer 2010
and February 2011 Uber had tens of thousands of paid rides in San Francisco alone).
86
Cf. Nolan Hicks & Ben Ware, Uber, Lyft Spending Now at $8.1 Million in Prop 1. Race,
MYSTATESMAN
(Apr.
29,
2016),
http://www.mystatesman.com/news/local-govt-politics/uber-lyft-spending-now-million-prop-race/NJUedjBB9NJs4hficHDsxN/
[https://perma.cc/8M7X-VDUE] (demonstrating Uber’s effort to create favorable
regulations); Ben Popper, Uber Can’t Be Stopped, So What Happens Next? VERGE (July 27,
2015), https://www.theverge.com/2015/7/27/9035731/future-of-uber-regulation-illegalviolations [https://perma.cc/P448-TQHL] (“We should be wary of Uber, which has so far
flouted almost all attempts at regulation.”); Tim Redmond, Why is SF Tolerating Airbnb’s
Bad Behavior?, 48HILLS.ORG (Oct. 6, 2016), http://48hills.org/2016/10/06/sf-toleratingairbnbs-bad-behavior/ [https://perma.cc/A46W-PUX9] (claiming the city’s Airbnb regulations
are a total sham and the city cannot or will not control illegal rentals).
87
See infra text accompanying notes 117–118.
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A. Uber
Part I described causes of tensions between regulators and platform
companies: nimble methods versus methodical methods; new business models
versus old rules and tools; and many resources versus few resources. These
three causes of tension are demonstrated in many of the interactions between
Uber and regulators in various localities. Uber was at first conciliatory
towards regulators, offering to educate regulators about why its business
model fell outside the categories of existing rules. As regulators continued to
issue punitive rules and penalties, however, Uber became more
confrontational and the fight escalated. While Uber eventually prevailed
against regulators in most cities around the world, the position it ultimately
embraced as a result—that it is not bound by existing rules— became, to the
company’s eventual detriment, a company mantra in all aspects of its
operations and culture.88
1. Early Interactions with Regulators
Uber was first available to the public to book rides in San Francisco in
July 2010 as UberCab.89 Despite its name, the company only provided a way
to book an on-demand ride in a luxury vehicle with a licensed driver, thereby
taking much of the hassle out of having to book and pay for a private ride.90
Within three months, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) and
the San Francisco Metropolitan Transit Authority (SFMTA) issued Uber a
cease-and-desist order for operating a taxi company without a license.91 In
response, Uber promptly dropped “Cab” from its name and continued to

88

See Dan Hill, Uber Doesn’t Have a PR Problem, It Has a Culture Problem, NEWSWEEK,
(Apr.
19,
2017),
http://www.newsweek.com/uber-culture-problem-pr-585511
[https://perma.cc/DLR8-C4U3] (“[t]hose kinds of ongoing and protracted legal and regulatory
battles undoubtedly contribute to why the company’s posture continues to be hyperaggressive”).
89
See Leena Rao, UberCab Takes the Hassle Out of Booking a Car Service, TECHCRUNCH
(July 5, 2010), https://techcrunch.com/2010/07/05/ubercab-takes-the-hassle-out-of-booking-acar-service/ [https://perma.cc/BEA2-NQZ3] (describing UberCab as a new service when the
article was written in 2010).
90
Id. (describing the service as convenient and asserting that passengers “receiv[e] better
service, a nice black limo and an on-demand solution”).
91
See Kolodny, supra note 84.

28

GEORGETOWN LAW TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

Vol 2:1

operate its black car service.92 The regulators meanwhile continued to insist
that Uber needed to register with the state, but Uber, which had just raised a
round of funding for $1.25 million,93 had the resources to hire lawyers. These
lawyers ultimately convinced the CPUC that Uber was not a taxi or limousine
service, but rather a referral service connecting those who wanted a ride to
those who could provide that ride—just as Expedia or Orbitz were referral
services that connected travelers to airlines.94 Uber also posted a conciliatory
statement on its website from then-CEO Ryan Graves.95 By late 2010, the
regulators agreed and issued a ruling allowing Uber to operate without
registering with the state.96
Uber, for the moment at peace with California regulators, took its
black car service to New York in May of 2011.97 Because that business model
(a limousine company using already licensed drivers) fit neatly within its
existing rules, the Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) initially gave Uber
permission to operate.98 When Uber pivoted and began competing with the
city’s taxi space in 2012, however, interactions with regulators became more
heated. Even though UberTaxi was designed to use already licensed taxi
drivers, Uber itself did not own medallions and wasn’t a licensed taxi
company. The TLC, using the tools available to it,99 issued rules that created
heavy fines and a possible loss of commercial licenses for drivers that
92

Laura Kolodny, Ubercab, Now Just Uber, Shares Cease and Desist Orders, TECHCRUNCH
(Oct. 25, 2010), https://techcrunch.com/2010/10/25/ubercab-now-just-uber-shares-cease-anddesist-orders/ [https://perma.cc/9B7C-63W6].
93
See Uber Funding Rounds, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/uber/f
unding_rounds/funding_rounds_list [https://perma.cc/XBD5-BPNZ] (indicating $1.25 million
was raised on October 10, 2010).
94
See STONE, supra note 3, at 122.
95
See Kolodny, supra note 84 (explaining that Graves indicated that Uber was “happy to help
educate the regulatory bodies on this new generation of technology and work closely with
both agencies to ensure compliance.”).
96
See STONE, supra note 3, at 122.
97
Uber NYC Has Launched, UBER (May 4, 2011), https://www.uber.com/blog/new-yorkcity/uber-nyc-launches-service/ [https://perma.cc/ZW4F-JE9M].
98
Wortham, supra note 5.
99
The Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) of New York City has the authority to regulate
and license all for-hire vehicles in New York City. See N.Y.C. Taxi and Limo Comm’n, supra
note 10. Each of its rules contains specific designations of the penalty for non-compliance
(most often a fine for operating without meeting the required licensing criteria). See, e.g., 35
R.C.N.Y. § 78-02, (2017), http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/rule_book_current_ch
apter_78.pdf [https://perma.cc/D259-V5BM].
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accepted rides through the Uber app.100 Uber quietly withdrew its taxi service,
but within a few months the TLC decided to allow a pilot program in
Manhattan. Around this time, Uber closed a Series B round for $37 million.101
Although there are no public records available to indicate exactly how Uber
used its financial resources,102 it is quite possible that Uber utilized lobbyists
to try to convince TLC commissioners to change their minds.103 In any event,
TLC commissioners were soon stating publicly that e-hailing apps were
inevitable.104 In late April 2013, UberTaxi was granted permission to operate
in New York City.105 By early 2017, Uber had become a major player in the
city.106 However, until quite recently, Uber was banned in all other parts of
New York state.107 Existing taxi companies lobbied their state legislators hard

100

Adrianne Jeffries, Uber Quietly Shutting Down Taxis in New York After Fight with
Regulators
(Update:
Uber
Confirmed),
VERGE
(Oct.
16,
2012),
https://www.theverge.com/2012/10/16/3451108/uber-taxi-pulls-out-new-york-tlc
[https://perma.cc/EU3Z-HVXB].
101
See Uber Funding Rounds, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/uber/
funding_rounds/funding_rounds_list [https://perma.cc/B6C7-G3DA] ($37,000,000 Series B
round closed Dec 11, 2012).
102
By 2014, it became public knowledge that Uber had employed an army of lawyers and
lobbyists in different cities throughout the country. See T.C. Sottek, Uber Has an Army of at
Least 161 Lobbyists and They’re Crushing Regulators, VERGE (Dec. 14, 2014, 2:55 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2014/12/14/7390395/uber-lobbying-steamroller
[https://perma.cc/CR4Y-VAK2].
103
See Rosalind Helderman, supra note 76 (noting that since 2012, Uber has hired private
lobbyists in at least fifty U.S. cities and states).
104
Adrianne Jeffries, NYC Regulators Approve Limited Pilot Program for Taxi Hailing Apps
Like Uber, VERGE (Dec. 13, 2012) https://www.theverge.com/2012/12/13/3762504/taxi-ehail-tlc-nyc-vote-uber-hailo [https://perma.cc/7GXX-8BC5] (quoting TLC Chairman David
Yasky).
105
Adrianne Jeffries, After Long Battle, Uber Becomes First Taxi App to Get Approved in
New York City, VERGE (Apr. 26, 2013) https://www.theverge.com/2013/4/26/4271490/uberbecomes-first-taxi-app-to-get-approved-in-new-york-city
[https://perma.cc/E87W-HB4L].
Skirmishes continue between the ride-sharing companies and the TLC. See, e.g., Dan Ravoli,
Uber and For-Hire Car Companies Unite to Fight TLC Wheelchair Plan, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Sept. 29, 2017), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/uber-for-hire-car-companies-unitefight-tlc-wheelchair-plan-article-1.3529233 [https://perma.cc/D34Y-S4K6].
106
See Hu, supra note 9 (noting that Uber, “the deep-pocketed newcomer[,] has become the
behemoth” in the ride-hailing market in NYC).
107
See Patrick Lohmann, Upstate NY’s Long Wait for Uber and Lyft Ending, What You Need
to Know, NYUPSTATE (June 26, 2017, 12:15 PM), http://www.newyorkupstate.com/news/201
7/06/upstate_nys_long_wait_for_uber_and_lyft_ending_what_you_need_to_know.html
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to keep Uber out of their markets.108 Demonstrating the impact of regulatory
capture, those regulators refused to change existing rules despite growing
consumer demand for ridesharing services.109
2. Uber Hardens its Positions as Regulatory Battles Continue
By mid-2013, Uber was operating in San Francisco, Seattle, Los
Angeles, Boston, Chicago, Washington, DC, New York City, and expanding
internationally.110 In each locale, Uber confronted regulatory challenges,
including large fines and outright bans.111 Perhaps as a result of all these
challenges, Uber’s public stance changed from the conciliatory language of
Ryan Graves’ blog post112 to the position that successful, innovative
[https://perma.cc/EB23-K42K] (Uber became “a political football in budget negotiations in
recent years” in the State Assembly).
108
See Luz Lazo, Cab Companies Unite Against Uber and Other Ride-Share Services, WASH.
POST (Aug. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/cabcompanies-unite-against-uber-and-other-ride-share-services/2014/08/10/11b23d52-1e3f-11e482f9-2cd6fa8da5c4_story.html?utm_term=.0cb6b7622211 [https://perma.cc/JXT6-6WAZ];
cf. Ben Carnes, New York Is Rightly Moving to Reduce Barriers for Companies such as Uber
and Lyft, HILL (Feb. 9, 2017), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/318635-newyork-is-rightly-moving-to-reduce-barriers-for-companies
[https://perma.cc/HV4N-PBCL]
(explaining that in New York state, “the cab industry has doubled down, using local insurance
requirements and other regulatory clubs to continue to bludgeon Uber and Lyft”).
109
Cf. Carnes, supra note 108 (“These regulatory battles are a product of an entrenched
monopoly’s taking for granted that a more efficient, more responsive service might emerge.”).
110
See Adam Lashinsky, Uber Banking on World Domination, FORTUNE (Sept. 18, 2014),
http://fortune.com/2014/09/18/uber-banks-on-world-domination/
[https://perma.cc/3Y6GYV8G].
111
See Downes, supra note 41 (“Indeed, according to Kalanick, the company has spent much
of its young life fighting in courts, public utility commissions, and city councils for the ability
to offer any service at all. Uber has already fought charges, fines, and bans in San Francisco,
Chicago, Massachusetts, New York, Washington D.C, and recently in Toronto, where city
officials have charged the company with dispatching rides without a license.”). These
responsive reactions by regulators are typical of what is happening throughout the country.
See, e.g., Tim Elfrink, UberX will Launch in Miami Today, Defying Miami-Dade’s Taxi Laws,
MIAMI NEW TIMES (June 4, 2014), http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/uberx-will-launchin-miami-today-defying-miami-dades-taxi-laws-6533024
[https://perma.cc/LGK7-RC7Z].
New Orleans regulators even sent Uber a cease-and-desist before it began operating in the
city. See Jeanie Riess, Why New Orleans Doesn’t Have Uber, GAMBIT (Feb. 4, 2014),
https://www.bestofneworleans.com/gambit/why-new-orleans-doesnt-haveuber/Content?oid=2307943 [https://perma.cc/FM4W-6ZRP].
112
See note 97.
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companies had to be “warriors” and keep on fighting.113 Uber was also quite
willing to state its disrespect for government officials in public.114 In 2012, at
TechCrunch Disrupt, Travis Kalanick criticized lawmakers, alleging that they
used three dubious strategies to challenge Uber: (1) they took steps to protect
the industry they regulated; (2) they labelled something illegal if it didn’t fit
neatly within their pre-existing categories; and (3) they didn’t do anything
until they had the chance to assess the “optics” of the situation.115 In 2013,
Kalanick said to a luncheon for Members of Congress that the anticompetitive measures aimed at Uber by local regulators were the result of
regulatory capture by the taxi industry.116 By 2014, Kalanick was blunt about
the way he viewed regulators: “We’re in a political campaign, and the
candidate is Uber and the opponent is [] named Taxi. . . . Nobody likes him,
he’s not a nice character, but he’s so woven into the political machinery and
fabric that a lot of people owe him favors.”117

113

Julie Bort, Uber CEO: Bring On The Cheap Competition, BUS. INSIDER (Sep. 12, 2012),
http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-ceo-travis-kalanick-lyft-2012-9
[https://perma.cc/8RSC-JCFA] (quoting Travis Kalanick’s interview at TechCrunch Disrupt
SF 2012: “You have to be a fighter, kind of be a warrior. If not, you should go do something
that’s a little less disruptive.”).
114
See Lunden, supra note 60. By late 2010, Ryan Graves, CEO of Uber at the time of the
initial cease-and-desist in California, had stepped down in favor of Travis Kalanick. See
Julian Chokkattu & Jordan Crook, A Brief History of Uber, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 14, 2014),
https://techcrunch.com/gallery/a-brief-history-of-uber/slide/14/
[https://perma.cc/BC8QFK2N]. Whether coincidental or not with that change in management and/or the fights with
regulators in New York, by 2011, Uber had become publicly more hostile towards regulations
and regulators than it was in 2010.
115
See Lunden, supra note 60.
116
Kalanick told Congressman Goodlatte in a public question-and-answer session at a
Congressional Internet Caucus Advisory Committee luncheon that Uber had to fight anticompetitive measures in many locales as the result of regulatory capture. Kalanick maintained
that the only reason Uber was able to counter the regulators was through use of social media
by appealing to its large consumer base. See Cong. Internet Caucus Advisory Comm., 2013
State of the Net Luncheon Keynote: Rep. Goodlatte w/ Travis Kalanick, CEO of Uber,
YOUTUBE (Jan. 22, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gFgjEGgS5-o.
117
Liz Gannes, Travis Kalanick: Uber Is Raising More Money to Fight Lyft and the
“Asshole” Taxi Industry, RECODE (May 28, 2014), https://www.recode.net/2014/5/28/116273
54/travis-kalanick-uber-is-raising-more-money-to-fight-lyft-and-the [https://perma.cc/RUV4RX4W].
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Despite the public criticisms described above, Uber was quite willing
to work behind the scenes to influence regulators.118 In addition, Uber learned
the power of its large user base.119 Uber demonstrated in Washington, D.C.
how easily it could mobilize the many consumers of its services to provide
direct pressure on their representatives in state and local government.120 As a
result of the many resources available to it,121 Uber has been able to adopt a
strategy of being one thing for one audience (highly-paid lobbyists for
politicians) and a different entity altogether for a second audience (a social
movement against backward-thinking regulators for its users).
This willingness to fight would continue even when conditions
changed. While Uber had been fighting to launch its black-car service in cities
around the world, three companies in San Francisco had begun offering peerto-peer ridesharing in which noncommercial drivers use their privately-owned
cars to offer rides on-demand.122 Despite its previous interactions with Uber
118

See Sottek, supra note 102 (“local lobbying registration records indicate the company hired
private lobbyists in at least 50 US cities and states and has hired at least 161 people to lobby
for its interests”).
119
See Laogoria-Chafkin, supra note 74 (quoting Kalanick) (“What we did in Chicago, what
we do in all these cities, is reach out to all of our users and say, take action—email your
councilperson; email the mayor. . . . Uber riders are the most affluent, influential people in
their cities. When we get to a critical mass, it becomes impossible to shut us down.”).
120
See Downes, supra note 41 (writing that “Uber and its kin have been saved not by
spending equal amounts of money lobbying, litigating, and performing other unsavory acts,
but by mobilizing a vocal army of loyal customers, who Tweet, Facebook, blog and show up
at city council meetings to shout down the illogic of traditional regulators”).
121
In the summer of 2017, Uber was valued at $68.5 billion. Amie Tsang, Morning Agenda:
Proving
Uber’s
Real
Value,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
24,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/24/business/dealbook/uber-revenue-valuation-ceoimmelt.html? [https://nyti.ms/2vr6Ylx]. As of July 2017, Uber had received over $11 billion
in
funding.
See
Uber
Funding
Rounds,
CRUNCHBASE,
https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/uber/funding_rounds/funding_rounds_list
[https://perma.cc/B6C7-G3DA].
122
See STONE, supra note 3, at 197–200. See also Ronnie Kerr, When Lyft Was Young: The
Early Years, VATOR (May 3, 2016), http://vator.tv/news/2016-05-03-when-lyft-was-youngthe-early-years-of-lyft [https://perma.cc/B29K-28LP] (Lyft launched in San Francisco in
August 2012); Tomio Geron, SideCar Acquires Austin’s HeyRide, Launches in Los Angeles,
Austin, Philadelphia, FORBES (Feb. 13, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013
/02/14/sidecar-acquires-austins-heyride-launches-in-los-angeles-austinphiladelphia/#70332a528891 [https://perma.cc/3XSN-AT5C] (Sidecar in early 2013
celebrated its one year anniversary of launch in San Francisco); Jennifer Van Grove, Wingz
Takes On Uber with Flat Fares for Airport Rides, SAN DIEGO TRIB. (Mar. 22, 2016),
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and its eventual accommodation of the black car service, the CPUC returned
to the same punitive enforcement mechanism it always used: it issued ceaseand-desist letters to Lyft, Sideshow, and Tickengo.123 The companies,
however, continued to operate.124 The CPUC responded by issuing citations
for $20,000 fees to Lyft and Sidecar.125 The companies protested publicly,
arguing that the charter-carrier regulations that the CPUC cited were
inapplicable to their business models.126 In this now-familiar refrain of (1)
launch of innovative service; (2) cease-and-desist letters issued by regulators;
(3) continued operation by innovators; (4) imposition of fees by regulators;
and (5) public protest, there was one indication that something had changed:
the CPUC indicated that it would work with the companies to determine rules
to regulate their services.127
Uber’s initial response to these developments in its hometown was to
try to get the ridesharing companies shut down.128 Even though the CPUC
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/technology/sdut-wingz-san-diego-airportrides-2016mar22-story.html [https://perma.cc/PX29-EJHA] (San Francisco-based Wingz,
originally known as Tickengo, launched in 2011).
123
Tomio Geron, Ride-Sharing Startups Get California Cease-And-Desist Letters, FORBES
(Oct. 8, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2012/10/08/ride-sharing-startupsget-california-cease-and-desist-letters/#282132a451d3 [https://perma.cc/5LGB-G2J8].
124
See Ryan Lawlor, While The California PUC Cracks Down on Ride-Sharing, Sidecar and
Lyft Commit to Staying on the Road, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 8, 2012),
https://techcrunch.com/2012/10/08/cpuc-ride-sharing-c-and-d/
[https://perma.cc/9EEDE76G].
125
See Press Release, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, CPUC Cites Passenger Carriers Lyft, Sidecar,
and Uber $20,000 Each For Public Safety Violations (Nov. 13, 2012),
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/Safety/Transportation
_Enforcement_and_Licensing/CPUCCitesPassengerCarriersLyftSideCarandUber20000Eachf
orPublicSafetyViolations.pdf [https://perma.cc/24NE-DER2] (citations for $20,000 issued to
Lyft, Sidecar, and Uber for operating charter-party carriers without proper licenses).
126
See Lawlor, supra note 124 (indicating each company’s reasons why citations are not
applicable to them); see also Logan Green & John Zimmer, Defending Lyft, LYFT BLOG (Nov.
14, 2012), https://blog.lyft.com/posts/2012/11/14/defending-lyft [https://perma.cc/XEA8NKKP] (“We oppose this citation as Lyft is not a charter-party carrier, we are a peer-to-peer
ridesharing platform. This is a case of regulators trying to put us into a box that doesn’t fit.”).
127
Green & Zimmer, supra note 134 (“The CPUC understands the importance of ridesharing
and they are discussing opening up a rulemaking process to design new regulations that
support peer-to-peer transportation.”).
128
Uber at this time was not a ridesharing company; it was operating only using drivers
already holding a commercial license in the cities they drove in. See STONE, supra note 3, at
196. Kalanick stated on a podcast in 2011—when rumors about ridesharing services were
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indicated that it was interested in speaking with the ridesharing companies to
receive their help to write new rules,129 Uber ignored the opportunity to
collaborate and launched a lobbying campaign with the CPUC against Lyft
and SideCar.130 Meanwhile, it was likely working on a competitive product in
case regulators allowed ridesharing companies to operate in California.131
In January 2013, the CPUC issued a consent decree with temporary
rules that protected consumers until a more complete analysis of the industry
could be undertaken.132 Uber signed the decree as well and began offering
ridesharing services.133 California eventually became the first state to write
permanent regulations aimed specifically at ridesharing companies.134 These
already beginning to circulate in startup circles—that “it would be illegal” to offer that
service. Kalanick stated that, when Uber begins operating in a city, it tries to be “totally
legitimately legal.” See id. at 199.
129
The CPUC allowed Lyft and SideCar to continue operating and invited the companies to
talk about how to move forward. See STONE, supra note 3, at 200. The lawyers for Lyft were
not confrontational, but instead adopted an attitude of collaboration and persuasion. Id. at
202–04. Looking back at the experience, the main lawyer for Lyft speculated that if Uber,
with its more confrontational attitude, had been the main proponent of ridesharing, the TNC
regulations would have included more stringent requirements. Id. at 204.
130
Kalanick argued directly to CPUC commissioners that ridesharing companies should be
banned in California. STONE, supra note 3, at 203.
131
This is a logical assumption based on the timing of events. The Consent Decree with the
CPUC was signed at the end of January 2013. See Term Sheet for Settlement between the
Safety and Enforcement Division of the California Public Utilities Commission and Uber
Technologies, Inc., http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/S
afety/Transportation_Enforcement_and_Licensing/Enforcement_Actions_Transportation_Net
work_Companies/UberTermSheetforSettlement.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GVK-FHFV]. On
April 12 2013, Uber rolled out “UBERX Rideshare.” See Gerry Shih, UberX Rideshare
Expanding: Controversial App Offering Taxi-Like Services Has New Plan For Big Cities,
HUFFPOST (Apr. 12, 2013, 11:54 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/13/uber-toexpand-private-ri_n_3074061.html [https://perma.cc/G2XU-BFWP] (“Speaking to reporters
in a conference call . . . Kalanick said he had withheld from launching a private vehicledispatching business until now due to its ‘extreme regulatory risk.’”).
132
STONE, supra note 3, at 204.
133
Press Release, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, CPUC Enters into Operating Agreement With
Uber, (Jan. 31, 2013), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M047/K151/47
151370.PDF [https://perma.cc/TA85-QX29] (“[The CPUC] will suspend its cease and desist
notice to Uber, as well as the $20,000 citation issued on Nov. 13, 2012, pending outcome of
the CPUC’s rulemaking.”).
134
Heather Somerville, California Becomes First State to Regulate Ride-Sharing Services,
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.mercurynews.com/2013/09/20/califo
rnia-becomes-first-state-to-regulate-ride-sharing-services/ [https://perma.cc/PTZ8-ATJQ].
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regulations became a template used by many other jurisdictions to craft their
own regulations for ridesharing companies.135
3. Uber Broadens its Defiance
Shortly after announcing its own ridesharing services, Uber publicly
released its principled approach to the conflicts between ride sharing and
regulation in the form of a white paper: Principled Innovation: Addressing the
Regulatory Ambiguity Around Ridesharing Apps.136 Despite its claim in the
White Paper to only operate where it has at least tacit regulatory approval,137
Uber used its resources—financial and technological—to work around
regulatory restrictions.
In some cities—like Austin, Texas—Uber used a different strategy to
defy regulators: it had sufficient resources to ignore the potential revenues
from the city and so opted to leave when the city continued to require
background checks for all drivers.138 In Portland, Oregon, Uber adopted yet
another strategy, demonstrating not only its ongoing disrespect for regulation,
but also the resources—this time not financial, but technical—it had at its
disposal. The company’s engineers developed a new technology named
Greyball that recognized when an enforcement officer used Uber’s app to hail

135

For example, Seattle, Texas, and Massachusetts created rules for Transportation Network
Companies. See Mass. Pub. Utils. Transp. Dep’t, Final Transportation Network Companies
Regulations Published, MASS.GOV (Sep. 22, 2017), https://www.mass.gov/news/finaltransportation-network-companies-regulations-published [perma.cc/7BXV-ZW8Y]; Tex.
Dep’t of Licensing and Transp., Transportation Network Companies, TDLR,
https://www.tdlr.texas.gov/tnc/tnclaw.htm [https://perma.cc/NSK9-8JED]; SEATTLE, WASH.,
MUN. CODE ch. 6.310 (2014), https://library.municode.com/wa/seattle/codes/municipal_code?
nodeId=TIT6BURE_SUBTITLE_IVNELICO_CH6.310TAFREVE [https://perma.cc/FVC2LGVE].
136
Travis Kalanick, Uber White Paper 1.0, BENEDELMAN.ORG (Apr. 12, 2013),
http://www.benedelman.org/uber/uber-policy-whitepaper-printfriendly.pdf
[https://perma.cc/49YU-6UVK].
137
Id.
138
When residents of Austin, Texas did not approve favorable rules for the regulation of
ridesharing companies, Uber pulled out of Austin completely. See Eliana Dockterman, Uber
and Lyft Are Leaving Austin after Losing Background Check Vote, FORTUNE (May 8, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/05/08/uber-lyft-leaving-austin/ [https://perma.cc/88ZX-78KU].
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a car.139 Once such an officer is identified as requesting a ride, the Greyball
software immediately cancels the ride. The result was that agents had a
difficult time collecting evidence that the company was operating illegally.
Allegedly, Uber used Greyball around the world to defy regulatory bans.140
The U.S. Department of Justice has launched an investigation into the
company’s use of Greyball to determine if it constituted obstruction of
justice.141
There are other instances of Uber leveraging its technological acumen
to skirt what is legally acceptable. For instance, in another program
(codenamed Hell) the company developed software that could track its drivers
to identify those Uber drivers who also drove for other ride-sharing
competitors, specifically Lyft.142 The software then targeted those drivers and
prioritized placing customers in their cars to keep them from switching to a
different app.143 Once Uber’s Hell program was revealed, drivers filed a class
action lawsuit against the company for violating driver privacy and sought
damages for anti-competitive behavior.144
Additional deceptive practices have also been alleged. A lawsuit has
been filed against the company alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment,
fraud, and unfair competition on the grounds that Uber uses software that
shows riders fares based on one route but directs drivers to take a shorter,
more efficient route.145 Riders are charged for the longer route while drivers
139

Mike Isaac, How Uber Deceives the Authorities Worldwide, (March 3, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/technology/uber-greyball-program-evadeauthorities.html [https://nyti.ms/2lngDck].
140
Id.
141
Mike Isaac, Justice Department Expands Its Inquiry into Uber’s Greyball Tool, N.Y.
TIMES (May 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/technology/uber-greyballinvestigation-expands.html [https://nyti.ms/2peOnpF].
142
See Carolyn Said, Feds Probe Uber ‘Hell’ Program for Tracking Lyft Drivers, S.F. GATE
(Sept. 8, 2017) http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Feds-probe-Uber-Hell-program-fortracking-12183963.php [https://perma.cc/S7YA-LRWE].
143
Remember, Uber also challenged a subpoena from the City of San Francisco over concerns
of a driver’s right to privacy. See id.
144
Megan Rose Dickey, Uber Gets Sued over Alleged ‘Hell’ Program to Track Lyft Drivers,
TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 24, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/04/24/uber-hell-lawsuit/
[https://perma.cc/KT6J-Q5FF].
145
See David Kravets, Uber Said to Use ‘Sophisticated Software’ to Defraud Drivers,
Passengers, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 6, 2017, 1:54 PM), https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2017/04/uber-said-to-use-sophisticated-software-to-defraud-drivers-passengers/
[http://perma.cc/BVG7-LU79].
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are paid for the shorter route, with Uber pocketing the difference.146 More
recently, Uber has been accused of renting cars it knew were defective to its
drivers in Singapore.147
Despite all the regulatory disputes and lawsuits, Uber continued to act
as if regulations did not apply to them. In late 2016, Uber, still headquartered
in San Francisco, announced that, although its initial testing of its driverless
cars had taken place in Pittsburgh, where it will continue to run, it was now
bringing them to San Francisco, and they would be publicly available. 148 The
California Department of Motor Vehicles issued rules for testing autonomous
vehicles in May of 2014 and required all manufacturers of driverless cars to
register them and receive a permit before testing them on California streets.149
Twenty companies complied with these regulations, including Waymo, Tesla,
and General Motor’s Cruise subsidiary.150 Uber, however, adopted a familiar
stance by beginning to test-drive its autonomous vehicles in San Francisco
without first registering with the DMV.151 The DMV immediately stated that
Uber was operating illegally for failure to register the cars on its site and
issued a cease-and-desist order.152 The DMV subsequently pulled the
146

Id.
Douglas MacMillan & Newley Purnell, Smoke, Then Fire: Uber Knowingly Leased Unsafe
Cars to Drivers, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/smoke-then-fireuber-knowingly-leased-unsafe-cars-to-drivers-1501786430?mg=prod/accounts-wsj.
148
Darrell Hetherington, Uber’s Self-Driving Cars Start Picking Up Passengers in San
Francisco, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 14, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/12/14/ubers-selfdriving-cars-start-picking-up-passengers-in-san-francisco/ [https://perma.cc/2UZG-WDED].
149
See California Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, Testing of Autonomous Vehicles, CA.GOV,
https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/vr/autonomous+/testing [https://perma.cc/C6U57BDT].
150
See Matt McFarland, Uber Blows Off Regulators, Tests Self-Driving Volvos in California,
CNN (Dec. 14, 2016, 9:38 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/12/14/technology/uber-selfdriving-cars-california-dmv/index.html [https://perma.cc/DM3L-VGJV].
151
Uber claimed that the DMV rules did not apply to their self-driving cars. See Christopher
Mele, In a Retreat, Uber Ends Its Self-Driving Car Experiment in San Francisco, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/technology/san-francisco-californiauber-driverless-car-.html [https://nyti.ms/2jRDb0f] (stating that Uber officials contend, under
the letter of California law, that the company did not need a permit because the Motor
Vehicles Department defined autonomous vehicles as those that drive “without the active
physical control or monitoring of a natural person” and Uber’s drivers interact with the car
more substantially).
152
Alison Griswold, Letter: California’s DMV Says Uber “Must Cease” Operating Its SelfDriving Cars, QUARTZ (Dec. 14, 2016), https://qz.com/863718/uber-received-a-stern-letterfrom-the-california-dmv-telling-it-to-cease-operating-its-self-driving-cars/
147
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registration on all of Uber’s self-driving cars (which were registered as
traditional vehicles) and demanded that the company go through the necessary
steps to receive a permit.153 Rather than comply, Uber echoed its reaction in
Austin and moved its autonomous vehicle operations to Phoenix.154 Within
three months, however, Uber returned to San Francisco.155 With very little
fanfare, it complied with the DMV’s licensing regime and began once again to
test its vehicles on the city’s streets.156
The attitude of disruption of anything and everything in its path began
to catch up to Uber and Travis Kalanick in 2017. In the first three-quarters of
the year, Uber has dealt with six major lawsuits involving sexual harassment,
privacy violations, driver classification, intellectual property, deceptive
practices and fights between Board members.157 Travis Kalanick resigned as
CEO158 and the Board voted to remove his super-voting rights, although he
will retain a seat on the Board.159
[https://perma.cc/2D78-GXC4]; see Mike Isaac, Uber Expands Self-Driving Car Service to
San Francisco. D.M.V. Says It’s Illegal., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/technology/uber-self-driving-car-san-francisco.html
[https://nyti.ms/2kgIzd1].
153
Avie Schneider, Uber Stops Self-Driving Test in California After DMV Pulls Registrations,
NPR (Dec. 21, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/12/21/506525679/uberstops-self-driving-test-in-california-after-dmv-pulls-registrations
[https://perma.cc/WK3E9AHW].
154
Greg Bensinger, Uber Moves Self-Driving Car Test to Arizona After Regulatory Defeat in
California, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-moves-selfdriving-car-test-to-arizona-after-regulatory-defeat-in-california-1482442732.
155
Greg Bensinger, Uber’s Self-Driving Cars Returning to California Roads, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ubers-self-driving-cars-returning-to-californiaroads-1489011778.
156
See Adam Brinklow, Uber Self-Driving Cars Coming Back to San Francisco, CURBED S.F.
(Mar. 9, 2017, 9:59 AM), https://sf.curbed.com/2017/3/9/14869564/uber-self-driving-returnsf [https://perma.cc/2WEK-5WZ4].
157
Anita Balakrishnan, Six Looming Legal Threats That Could Still Sink Uber, CNBC (June
18, 2017, 3:42 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/18/uber-faces-big-legal-threats-lawyers.html [https://perma.cc/P2HN-ANRF].
158
Mike Isaac, Inside Travis Kalanick’s Resignation as Uber’s C.E.O., N.Y. TIMES (June 21,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/21/technology/uber-travis-kalanick-finalhours.html [https://nyti.ms/2sSsX7c].
159
Katie Benner & Mike Isaac, Uber’s Board Approves Changes to Reshape Company’s
Power
Balance,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
3,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/technology/ubers-board-approves-changes-to-reshapepower-balance.html [https://nyti.ms/2xR33kL].
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Over the course of its short life, Uber became the poster child of
disruption. The company is known for not only disrupting the taxi industry,
but also for disrupting regulatory systems.160 The conciliatory language of the
2010 blog post, describing a desire to work with regulators, was lost in the
need to fight outright bans, punitive fees, and expensive lawsuits. As Uber
pushed into new cities and continued its regulatory battles, investors and the
public initially responded with support and encouragement.161 Unfortunately,
Uber applied that same aggressive defiance to every aspect of its business, and
negative consequences continue to arise.162 It is unlikely that one single factor
caused Uber’s corrosive culture. Nevertheless, it is interesting to ponder
whether Uber might have adopted a company mantra other than defiance, if
regulators had reached out with more collaborative tools at the time the
company was still looking to educate and work with rulemakers.163
B. Airbnb
Like Uber, Airbnb helped shape the platform economy in San
Francisco. Unlike Uber, it had no immediate confrontations with California
regulators. In fact, Airbnb operated for six years,164 simply ignoring
160

See, e.g., Helderman, supra note 76 (“Uber has pioneered not just a new sort of taxi service
but also a new way to change long-standing local ordinances.”).
161
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 4 (explaining why investors and users support Uber). See
ADAM LASHINSKY, WILD RIDE: INSIDE UBER’S QUEST FOR WORLD DOMINATION 98 (2017)
(describing Uber’s launch into new markets and the public media’s response).
162
See, e.g., Bruce Sterling, Actual Sharista Guys Never Liked Uber Very Much, WIRED (Aug.
3, 2017), https://www.wired.com/beyond-the-beyond/2017/07/actual-sharista-guys-neverlike-uber-much/ [https://perma.cc/J4AN-HBMZ] (describing the long-lasting, toxic impact of
Uber’s example). New consequences of Uber’s deceptive practices continue. See, e.g., Greg
Nibler, Uber Will Be Banned from Operating in London for Deceptive Practices, DIGITAL
TRENDS (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.digitaltrends.com/dt-daily/dt-daily-uber-bannedlondon/ [https://perma.cc/6UHY-VCAZ].
163
Cf. Sterling, supra note 162 (Uber’s “‘don’t ask permission, ask for forgiveness later’
strategy is now part of the Silicon Valley startup playbook. Thousands of entrepreneurs now
likely believe that breaking the law is fine for the sake of disruption.”).
164
Cf. STONE, supra note 3, at 17 (showing that the first guest to airbedandbreakfast.com
arrived on October 16, 2007); Leena Rao, Y Combinator’s Airbed and Breakfast Casts a
Wider Net for Housing Rentals as AirBnB, TECHCRUNCH (May 4, 2009),
https://techcrunch.com/2009/03/04/y-combinators-airbed-and-breakfast-casts-a-wider-net-forhousing-rentals-as-airbnb/ [https://perma.cc/C6XH-6EBD] (showing that Airbed and
Breakfast eventually relaunched as Airbnb); Carolyn Said, Airbnb’s Long, Complex History
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California’s 1981 law that banned all short-term rentals.165 When the Board of
Supervisors, San Francisco’s legislative body, finally addressed the need to
regulate home-sharing platforms like Airbnb, the Board had already
recognized Airbnb’s benefit.166 The new law limited the number of days a
property could be “shared,” and it required all hosts to register with the city,
but the city had a hard time enforcing these requirements.167
Although the General Counsel of Airbnb has asserted that the
company had a desire to be authentic and transparent with customers and
government officials,168 a series of harsh actions from state legislators

with
San
Francisco,
S.F.
GATE
(May
1,
2017,
5:08
PM),
http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Airbnb-s-long-complex-history-with-San11113222.php [https://perma.cc/FR3D-7TW7] (stating that prior to October 2014, short-term
rentals—i.e. rentals of less than thirty days—were illegal).
165
Mary Catherine Wiederhold, Illegal Short-Term Rentals, MCW REAL ESTATE L. (Mar. 18,
2012), http://mcwrealestatelaw.com/tenant-rights/illegal-short-term-rentals/ [https://perma.cc/
QBW7-G8GH] (stating that in 1981, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors passed an
ordinance that forbade a landlord from renting an apartment for less than 30 days without
obtaining a permit to convert the property to tourist use).
166
S.F.
CAL.
ORDINANCE
218–14
§
1(C)(1)
(Oct.
7,
2014),
http://www.sfbos.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/bdsupvrs/ordinances14/o0218-14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DQ2U-HCTK] (providing that “the advent of new technology, the rise of the
sharing economy, and the economic and social benefit to residents of sharing resources” led to
the continued increase in short-term rental activity and prompted the city to change its laws to
“create a pathway to legalize this activity”); see Marcus Wohlsen, San Francisco’s New
Housing Rules Are the Best Thing to Happen to Airbnb, WIRED (Oct. 8, 2014),
https://www.wired.com/2014/10/san-franciscos-new-limits-best-thing-happen-airbnb
[https://perma.cc/E2W7-7PTQ].
167
See Megan Barber, Airbnb vs. the City, CURBED (Nov. 10, 2016),
https://www.curbed.com/2016/11/10/13582982/airbnb-laws-us-cities [https://perma.cc/FTN6GMKF] (Describing that San Francisco is imposing a new law, because San Francisco
regulators had such a hard time enforcing 2014 Airbnb law and that the new law puts the
burden of enforcement on Airbnb itself.); see also Carolyn Said, S.F. to Create City Office to
Enforce Airbnb Law, S.F. GATE (July 2, 2015), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/S-Fto-create-city-office-to-enforce-Airbnb-law-6361832.php
[https://perma.cc/98TV-792Z]
(stating that by July 2015, only 700 hosts, of the more than 5000 listing properties on
Airbnb’s platform had registered with the city pursuant to the 2014 law’s requirements).
168
Cf. STONE, supra note 3, at 213, 215 (explaining that Airbnb’s executives spent months
hashing out the core values of the company and noting that that Belinda Johnson, the General
Counsel, told New York regulators that the company “wanted to build a positive kind of
credibility with cities” that was authentic to the founders).
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changed its approach.169 New York state regulators did not see Airbnb in the
same light in which it saw itself.170 In part, this unfriendly response was due to
Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s long-time plan to go after avaricious landlords,
but complaints about one of Airbnb’s New York hosts helped to produce the
2010 law that contained a statewide prohibition of short-term rentals.171 The
law made it illegal to rent out a residence for less than 30 days unless the
permanent resident was also present.172
At this time, Airbnb was still attempting to cooperate with government
officials and offered to work with New York to pass a law that would impose
an occupancy tax on its New York hosts.173 Nevertheless, the state’s harsh
punitive reactions continued when the New York Attorney General issued a
subpoena for the names, addresses, and contact information for all hosts in the
state.174
In response, Airbnb dropped its cooperative attitude.175 About to close
a Series C funding round for $200 million,176 Airbnb used its resources to take
169

Alison Griswold, Move Over Uber: Airbnb Is No Longer the Nice Guy of the Sharing
Economy, QUARTZ (Dec. 5, 2016), https://qz.com/842996/what-happens-when-a-30-billionstartup-stops-being-nice-and-starts-being-real/ [https://perma.cc/3B9V-3DKX] (“After years
of playing the nice guy, Airbnb now finds itself on the defensive in some of its biggest
markets, and the pressure doesn’t suit. The company has unleashed lawsuits, held rallies, and
spent millions on lobbying campaigns.”).
170
See STONE, supra note 3, at 215 (quoting New York State Senator Liz Kreuger saying “I
have never dealt with a company as disingenuous as Airbnb has been over and over again.”).
171
Id. at 216–21 (describing in detail the Hotel Toshi debacle that helped to produce “a
stifling law in New York City”).
172
Dailey, supra note 84.
173
Brian Chesky, Who We Are, What We Stand for, AIRBNB: BLOG (Oct. 3, 2013),
http://blog.atairbnb.com/who-we-are/ [https://perma.cc/9QDZ-76GH] (“On behalf of our New
York City community, we want to work for sensible laws that allow New Yorkers to share
their space, earn extra income, and pursue their American Dream.”). Airbnb also offered to
set up a 24/7 hotline for complaints by New York residents about Airbnb rentals. STONE,
supra note 3, at 228. New York policymakers were not impressed. See id. at 228–29.
174
Matt Chaban, Attorney General Eric Schneiderman Hits Airbnb with Subpoena for User
Data, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/stateairbnb-article-1.1477934 [https://perma.cc/3RQ3-HPYY]. According to Brad Stone, the
Attorney General’s office believed that, despite its public announcements to the contrary,
Airbnb was not attempting to take illegal hoteliers off its site or actually working on a way to
collect occupancy taxes. STONE, supra note 3, at 228.
175
Cf. Gerry Shih, Accommodation Renter Airbnb Fights NY State Subpoena on Sublets,
REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2013, 6:23 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-airbnbsubpoena/accommodation-renter-airbnb-fights-ny-state-subpoena-on-sublets-
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New York to court.177 Airbnb’s lawyers argued that the subpoena was too
broad and violated its user’s privacy.178 The judge in the case ruled in
Airbnb’s favor.179 The New York Attorney General issued a new subpoena
that met the judge’s concerns and eventually, with no other choice, Airbnb
agreed to turn over anonymized data.180 Despite receiving the data it
requested, the state of New York continued to refuse to come to an agreement
with the company to legitimize short-term rentals.181 As a result of these
prohibitions and demands in New York and other jurisdictions,182 Airbnb

idUSBRE9981AR20131009 [https://perma.cc/X73J-26KY] (noting that David Hantman,
Airbnb’s Head of Global Policy, criticized a subpoena for the records of all Airbnb hosts in
New York State as “unreasonably broad” and vowed to fight it with “everything we’ve got”).
176
See Airbnb Funding Rounds, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/air
bnb/funding_rounds/funding_rounds_list [https://perma.cc/E6SA-76GW] (showing that on
October 28, 2013, Airbnb closed a Series C round with Founders Fund).
177
Shih, supra note 175 (“Airbnb, the room-rental service, went to court Wednesday [October
9, 2013] to block a subpoena from the New York Attorney General”).
178
Id. (“The subpoena would be difficult for the company to comply with because it covers
data from hundreds of thousands of separate records, the company told the New York State
Supreme Court in a filing.”); David Streitfeld, New York’s Case Against Airbnb is Argued in
Albany, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/technology/alban
y-judge-hears-case-against-airbnb.html [https://nyti.ms/2jczZk8] (quoting Airbnb’s lawyer as
criticizing the subpoena for its “extreme and incredible scope” and for asking for its user’s
“confidential information”).
179
Nick Wingfield, A Victory for Airbnb in New York, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/14/technology/judge-quashes-new-york-subpoena-forairbnb-records.html [https://nyti.ms/2p7oF9Z].
180
STONE, supra note 3, at 235. In 2015, Airbnb released additional data in response to
continued complaint over a lack of transparency. See Yoav Gonen & Amber Sutherland, Most
Airbnb Rentals Violate the State’s Short-Term Leasing Law, N.Y. POST (Dec. 2, 2015),
http://nypost.com/2015/12/02/most-airbnb-rentals-violate-the-states-short-term-leasing-law/
[https://perma.cc/3H6F-BPYQ].
181
STONE, supra note 3, at 276–77 (hotels and hotel workers’ unions began to realize how
much of a threat Airbnb was to their industry and lobbied politicians to not sign an agreement
with the company).
182
Cf. Griswold, supra note 169 (noting that, at the time the article was written, “Airbnb’s
peer-to-peer rentals [were] being scrutinized in Los Angeles; Miami Beach, Florida; Portland,
Oregon; Toronto; Barcelona; and Berlin”); Niki Cervantes, Santa Monica Gets Even Tougher
on Short-Term Vacation Rental ‘Hosts’, SANTA MONICA LOOKOUT (Jan. 12, 2017),
http://www.surfsantamonica.com/ssm_site/the_lookout/news/News-2017/January2017/01_12_2017_Santa_Monica_Gets_Even_Tougher_on_Short_Term_Vacation_Rental_H
osts.html [https://perma.cc/2JCJ-WRXB] (describing registration restrictions that were
imposed on Airbnb in the city of Santa Monica).
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quickly learned how to go to war with regulators and other government
officials hostile to its business model.183
This new attitude towards outside threats to its business was also put to
the test in Airbnb’s hometown. In San Francisco, a coalition of housing
activists, landlords, neighborhood groups, and hotel workers’ unions were
unhappy about the leniency and unenforceability of the 2014 short-term rental
law in the city.184 They joined together to get sufficient signatures to place a
proposition on the November 15, 2015 ballot.185 Proposition F, if approved by
the city’s voters, would severely limit the number of days permitted for shortterm rentals, require hosts and platforms to supply data on usage every
quarter, and give standing to neighbors and activists to sue for violations of
the rules.186
Having learned in New York and elsewhere that appeasement did not
always work, Airbnb went to war. In June, Airbnb raised another round of
funding, this time for $1.5 billion,187 and quickly invested $8 million to defeat

183

Cf. Adrienne Jeffries, Airbnb Will Fight Regulators on Behalf of Host Who Was Fined
$2400, VERGE (June 5, 2013), https://www.theverge.com/2013/6/5/4398534/airbnb-newyork-fine-nigel-warren-public-policy-fight [https://perma.cc/53JT-TB3V] (noting that Airbnb
was starting to “clash with regulators in New York City” and, for the first time, “proactively
got[] involved in an individual case”). Stone has compared Brian Chesky, the CEO and
founder of Airbnb, to Kalanick, stating that, although Chesky’s reputation survived better in
these early years than Kalanick’s, Chesky was every bit as disruptive, determined, and
unethical as Uber’s CEO. See STONE, supra note 3, at 278.
184
Carolyn Said, Prop. F Splits Neighbors on Whether Airbnb Hurts or Helps Housing, S.F.
CHRONICLE (Oct. 17, 2015), http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Prop-F-splitsneighbors-on-whether-Airbnb-hurts-6575919.php [https://perma.cc/4HTL-2KS2] (“Prop. F
unites unlikely bedfellows—housing activists and landlords; unions, especially hotel workers;
and neighborhood groups—to oppose short-term rentals.”).
185
Carolyn Said, Airbnb Foes Mount Campaign for S.F. Ballot Measure, S.F. GATE (May 1,
2015),
http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Airbnb-foes-mount-campaign-for-SF-ballotmeasure-6231816.php [https://perma.cc/2VBP-J58Z].
186
Tracey Lien, Everything You Need to Know About San Francisco’s Airbnb Ballot
Measure, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tnairbnb-prop-f-san-francisco-20151029-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/KHR7-LLXL]; Said,
supra note 68 (Prop. F supporters believed the city’s existing regulations for short-term
rentals were “toothless”).
187
Airbnb Funding Rounds, supra note 176 (noting that on June 28, 2015, Airbnb raised a
Series E round for $1.5 billion).
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the measure.188 It also demonstrated the power of its user base, mobilizing
those who used its platform, whether as host or guest, to go door-to-door to
convince voters that Prop. F was not the right way forward. On November 3,
2015, Prop. F was defeated.189
The city of San Francisco, however, had realized from this battle that a
significant number of constituents were not satisfied with its apparent leniency
with Airbnb and other home-sharing platforms. And, despite its victory,
Airbnb’s image in the Bay Area had been tarnished by some of its ads during
the campaign.190 The Board of Supervisors soon began to debate how to pass
and enforce a new, more restrictive regime for short-term rentals. In June of
2016, the new bill was passed, continuing to require all hosts to register with
the city, but switching the burden of enforcement to Airbnb.191 If hosts listing
properties in San Francisco had not registered with the city, Airbnb was
subject to large fines (up to $1,000 per day) and criminal penalties.192
Just as in New York, the company did not want to turn over data about
its hosts or assume corporate liabilities for their actions.193 Shortly after the

188

Biz Carson, Airbnb Has Spent More Than $8 Million Fighting a Proposed Law in San
Francisco, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 28, 2015, 4:02 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/airbnbspends-8-million-against-prop-f-2015-9 [https://perma.cc/9GF4-AJTJ].
189
Kia Kokalitcheva, San Francisco Voters Reject ‘Anti-Airbnb’ Ballot Measure, FORTUNE
(Nov.
4,
2015),
http://fortune.com/2015/11/04/san-francisco-votes-airbnb/
[https://perma.cc/46S2-R2XH] (quoting an Airbnb statement after the vote: “This victory was
made possible by the 138,000 members of the Airbnb community who had conversations with
over 105,000 voters and knocked on 285,000 doors. The effort showed that home sharing is
both a community and a movement.”). In contrast to the almost $8.5 million Airbnb spent,
supporters of Prop. F raised just $1,138,567. City of San Francisco Initiative to Restrict ShortTerm
Rentals,
Proposition
F
(November
2015),
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/City_of_San_Francisco_Initiative_to_Restrict_ShortTerm_Rentals,_Proposition_F_(November_2015) [https://perma.cc/HV6S-DF87] (listing
funds raised by both sides).
190
See STONE, supra note 3, at 286–87. After the San Francisco vote, residents in other
localities began to fight for restrictions on short-term rentals in their cities. Id. at 291.
191
Cf. Joshua Sabatini, SF Legislators Approve Tougher Rules for Airbnb, S.F. EXAMINER
(June 7, 2016, 3:25 PM), http://www.sfexaminer.com/sf-legislators-approve-tougher-rulesairbnb/ [https://perma.cc/UU8K-J9W7] (noting that the legislation imposed fines on the shortterm rental websites themselves for posting listings of unregistered residents).
192
Id. For the latest version of the code, see S.F. ADMIN. CODE ch. 41, § 41A.5(g) (2017).
193
Cf. Kia Kokalitcheva, Airbnb Sues Its Hometown over Latest Short-Term Rental
Crackdown, FORTUNE (June 27, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/27/airbnb-san-franciscolawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/38PS-68SG] (describing Airbnb’s law suit against San Francisco
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law’s passage, Airbnb filed a suit seeking an injunction to prevent the city
from enforcing the law, arguing that the new ordinance violated the
company’s rights under the Communications Decency Act (CDA) and the
First Amendment.194 In response to Airbnb’s complaint, the Board of
Supervisors passed Ordinance 178-16 which amended the law to “abandon[]
any requirements or restrictions on the publication of a rental listing” and
“ma[de] it a misdemeanor to collect a fee for providing booking services for
the rental of an unregistered unit.”195 Nevertheless, Airbnb maintained its
argument that the regulations violated their rights and added the argument that
the regulations unlawfully imposed criminal strict liability. 196 Airbnb used
provisions of the CDA to argue that the company was not responsible—and
could not be held accountable—for what properties people decided to list on
its platform.197
As Airbnb was waiting for the ruling in the San Francisco, Governor
Cuomo of New York signed a new law imposing harsh fines on short-term
rental hosts that violate its provisions.198 New York had already banned
rentals of fewer than 30 days in a multi-unit building, but the new law made
listing an advertisement for such a prohibited rental also illegal, perhaps

challenging the regulations that required it to share data on rentals and imposed stiff fines for
every unlisted property that appeared on its website).
194
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Airbnb, Inc. v. City and Cty. of San
Francisco, No. 3:16-cv-03615-JD (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2016), ECF 1.
195
Airbnb, Inc. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1070 (N.D. Cal.
2016). This action by the Board of Supervisors to impose liability based on an action by the
platforms, i.e., the collection of a booking fee, was a clever way to circumvent the protections
the CDA provides for content posted on the Internet.
196
Id. at 1071. The 20-year-old Communications Decency Act was written to protect Internet
providers from being responsible for content posted by users. Id. at 1074 (“Congress enacted
Section 230 primarily ‘to protect websites against the evil of liability for failure to remove
offensive content.’”) (quoting Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1174
(9th Cir. 2008)).
197
See id. at 1071–72. See also Jack Segal, Airbnb and the End of the Short-Term Rental
War [BeaconExplains], BAY CITY BEACON (June 14, 2017), https://www.thebaycitybeacon.c
om/politics/airbnb-and-the-end-of-the-short-term-rental-war/article_623e8b6a-511b-11e78ad3-e3ce6bea0cf8.html [https://perma.cc/Z4N4-PLFU] (describing the history of the 2016
lawsuit).
198
See Nathan Ingraham, New York Passes Law Making it Illegal to List Short-Term Rentals
on Airbnb, ENGADGET (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.engadget.com/2016/10/21/new-yorkpasses-law-making-it-illegal-to-list-short-term-rentals/ [https://perma.cc/AB7P-N5GG].
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subjecting Airbnb itself to the fines of up to $7,500 per violation.199 Within
hours, Airbnb filed a lawsuit alleging that the new law violated its
constitutional rights on much the same grounds it used in its lawsuit against
the city of San Francisco.200
In November of 2016, the judge in the San Francisco case ruled that it
was unlikely that Airbnb would prevail on the merits of its claims.201
Carefully distinguishing prior cases under the Communications Decency Act,
the court found that the San Francisco law was not imposing liability on
Airbnb for its role as a content publisher, but for its conduct in taking a fee for
the booking of an unregistered listing.202 The court also found that Airbnb had
not met the standards for First Amendment scrutiny or those for contesting the
imposition of criminal liability.203
Airbnb quickly recognized that it had its back against a wall. In the
week following the judge’s ruling, Chris Lehane, Airbnb’s Global Head of
Policy, wrote an op-ed in the San Francisco Chronicle stating that the
company was ready to cooperate with city officials to create a simplified
registration system that would share information about hosts’ listings and
rentals with the city.204 By the beginning of December, the company had also
settled with the state of New York.205

199

Id.
Katie Benner, Airbnb Sues Over New Law Regulating New York Rentals, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/technology/new-york-passes-lawairbnb.html [https://nyti.ms/2kqvvlv] (“[T]he company contends that the law violates the
company’s constitutional rights to free speech and due process, as well as the protection it is
afforded under the Communications Decency Act.”).
201
Carolyn Said, Airbnb Rebuked in SF Lawsuit, S.F. GATE (Nov. 8, 2016, 5:11 PM),
http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Airbnb-rebuked-in-SF-lawsuit-10602042.php
[https://perma.cc/L79T-T6SA].
202
See Airbnb, Inc. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1073–76.
203
Id. at 1076–80.
204
Chris Lehane, How Airbnb, SF Can Help Hosts Meet City’s Rules, S.F. CHRONICLE (Nov.
13, 2016), http://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/How-Airbnb-SF-can-helphosts-meet-city-s-rules-10611714.php [https://perma.cc/YR2J-9U3Q]. On May 1, 2017,
Airbnb and the city of San Francisco announced they had reached a settlement. Herrera
Repels Legal Challenge to Short-Term Rental Law, Secures Settlement with Airbnb and
Homeaway, CITY ATT’Y S.F. (May 1, 2017), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/2017/05/01/herre
ra-repels-legal-challenge-short-term-rental-law-secures-settlement-airbnb-homeaway/
[https://perma.cc/VAC9-M7XT]. Airbnb agreed to a process that would ensure its users are
registered with the city before their listings can be booked on the platform and to share data
200
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Airbnb has spent money, time and effort battling regulators and their
harsh penalties for six years. Nevertheless, the company recognized that an
attitude of defiance was no longer serving its interests.206 The bad publicity
and aura of regulatory uncertainty from its continued battles with lawmakers
was affecting the company’s valuation at either future funding rounds or an
IPO.207 Perhaps if the regulators in New York and San Francisco had a more
collaborative process for working with Airbnb when it first began to operate,
everyone would have been better off.
In this section, we demonstrated that traditional regulatory processes
cause escalating tension between innovative companies and rule makers. In
pursuit of their goals of consumer safety and economic growth, regulators are
most likely to use antiquated enforcement mechanisms as the basis for their
initial interactions with new entrants to the industry. 208 In response, companies
like Uber and Airbnb use their financial resources, large customer base, and
continually evolving technology to avoid complying with rules they did not
on its hosts with the city on a regular basis. Id. Airbnb remains criminally liable if it fails to
do so. See S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 41A.5(e) (2017).
205
Katie Benner, Airbnb Ends Fight with New York City over Fines, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/technology/airbnb-ends-fight-with-new-yorkcity-over-fines.html [https://nyti.ms/2ktJG9n].
206
See As Airbnb De-Escalates Legal Fight with Regulators, What’s Next?, INVESTORS BUS.
DAILY (Dec. 8, 2016), http://www.investors.com/news/as-airbnb-de-escalates-legal-fightwith-regulators-whats-next/ [https://perma.cc/3M7N-B3QQ] (describing Airbnb’s transition
form a “bare-knuckles approach” to starting to get along with regulators); see also Mike Isaac,
Airbnb Pledges to Work with Cities and Pay ‘Fair Share’ of Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/technology/airbnb-pledges-to-work-with-citiesand-pay-fair-share-of-taxes.html [https://nyti.ms/2mVTpq1]. Airbnb’s company culture lends
itself to cooperation more than that of Uber. Its motto, “Be a Host,” may have opened doors to
cooperation. See supra text accompanying note 130.
207
See Kia Kokalitcheva, Airbnb Changes Its Tune in New York, FORTUNE (Dec. 6, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/12/06/airbnb-drops-ny-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/6ML4-SZCC].
208
Innovation has occurred in many industries, and as a result, regulators have been hardpressed to apply old regulation to new business models. Just as with regulators like the CPUC
and the TLC, other regulators have been given broad authority over the industries they
administer but their mechanisms are less and less fit for the job. See Stephanie Forshee, CFTC
Announces Innovation Lab for Fintechs, NAT’L L.J. (May 17, 2017),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202786468443/CFTC-Announces-Innovation-Labfor-Fintechs [https://perma.cc/GA3G-C8JJ] (quoting CFTC Acting Chairman J. Christopher
Giancarlo saying “[t]he world is changing. Our parents’ financial markets are gone. . . . Yet,
despite these 21st century innovations, the CFTC remains stuck in a 20th century time
warp.”).
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believe applied to them. Ultimately, both sides compromised to some extent,
but there was a great deal of time, money, and effort expended by every
participant to get to that result. In Part III, we suggest a change in regulatory
procedures so that similar losses do not occur when the next innovative
business appears.

III. AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD FOR ALTERNATIVE RULEMAKING
In the spirit of innovation, this paper posits a different method for
rulemaking that may yield more positive results for regulators as well as
innovators. The process we suggest is adapted from research and design labs
around the world, and is called design thinking. Design thinking offers a
modern organization or bureaucracy a means to cultivate creativity and
innovation.209 It has been said that the success rate for innovation dramatically
improves when design principles are used to achieve it.210
A. What is Design Thinking?
Design thinking is a solution-focused method that begins by
identifying a goal instead of a problem. In this way, the process encourages an
action-oriented approach and uses “logic, imagination, intuition and systemic
reasoning . . . to create desired outcomes.”211 Design thinking is also usercentric and thus requires an examination of the needs, experiences, and
viewpoints of the user.

209

What Is Design Thinking?, DESIGN MGMT INST., http://www.dmi.org/?WhatisDesignThink
[https://perma.cc/KU76-NAUQ]; see also Michael T. McHugh, Driving Government
Transformation Through Design Thinking, FED. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2016),
https://www.federaltimes.com/opinions/2016/08/24/driving-government-transformationthrough-design-thinking/ [https://perma.cc/V4NQ-DXT3] (“federal agencies are beginning to
use design thinking to creatively address mission objectives and improve processes”).
210
See Linda Naiman, Design Thinking as a Strategy for Innovation, CREATIVITY AT WORK,
https://www.creativityatwork.com/design-thinking-strategy-for-innovation/
[https://perma.cc/5XCC-GT48] (citing a 2014 study by the Design Management Institute to
state that “[d]esign-led companies such as Apple, Coca-Cola, IBM, Nike, Procter & Gamble
and Whirlpool have outperformed the S&P 500 over the past 10 years by an extraordinary
219%”).
211
This description is drawn from a more expansive discussion of the attributes of design
thinking. See Armitage, supra note 30, at 34–41; see also Naiman, supra note 213.
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The design-thinking process involves successive steps, each of which
utilizes input from all stakeholders to forge workable solutions. The best
solutions are identified and then tested through experimentation with actual
users in real-world situations. The feedback gained from those users is then
utilized to redesign the possible solutions, with the resulting versions again
sent out for testing. These successive feedback loops are reminiscent of the
iterative cycles of agile product development, and help in the same way to
quickly generate the information necessary to create the best possible
results.212
The specific steps of design thinking are as follows:












212

Identify the problem to solve
Identify the stakeholders, who then set their individual goals
(divergent thinking)213
Convene to brainstorm solutions with all stakeholders participating
(convergent thinking)214
Choose and implement best solutions
Solicit stakeholder feedback
Revise and retest solutions
Continue with feedback loops until the most appropriate solution has
been reached
Release the most appropriate solution to a small segment of the public
in a beta test
Iterate process again based on data from beta tests
Test again and collect feedback
Continue process when necessary to adapt to new innovations

See Lohr, supra note 57.
Divergent thinking—the process by which each stakeholder individually determines its
own goals for the project—is an important part of design thinking because it ensures the
integrity of each stakeholder’s specific goal. Goal setting is an important part of the design
thinking process because it allows stakeholders to envision their ideal situation prior to
making any outside considerations.
214
Divergent thinking is a vital part of the beginning of the design thinking process.
Convergent thinking, during which the group as a whole examines the individual goals of
each stakeholder, is at the crux of this method’s efficacy. Stakeholders must come together to
discuss all the viewpoints they each must take into account in creating a solution.
213
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While design thinking may not be a panacea for every issue that
plagues regulatory agencies, its emphasis on innovation and collaboration
helps to facilitate open communication with entrepreneurs and the companies
they build.
B. Design Thinking in the Private Sector
It is tempting to dismiss this agile and flexible process as relevant only
to the sorts of teams that meet in co-working spaces in Silicon Valley. This
collaborative method, however, is already making an impact in reimagining
systems in various corporate sectors.
For example, Kaiser Permanente hired innovation lab IDEO to help
them rethink the processes Kaiser uses to manage patient care. The goal was
to diminish medical errors and oversights while improving overall efficiency
and return on investment.215 IDEO convinced Kaiser to include all levels of
management in the process because successful innovation cannot occur in a
vacuum.216 Members of the Kaiser Permanente Innovation Team spent long
periods of time observing nurses and going through the design thinking
steps.217 Ultimately, IDEO and Kaiser designed a new program called the
Nurse Knowledge Exchange.218 This program has lowered costs by 47% and
is now operating in every Kaiser Permanente hospital.219
We posit that the same stakeholder-focused, collaborative process that
Kaiser Permanente used for this successful innovation could also be
implemented by governmental agencies in the regulatory process.220
Regulators currently rely on punitive measures to achieve their goals of
215

See Lew McCreary, Kaiser Permanente’s Innovation on the Front Line, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Sept.
2010),
https://hbr.org/2010/09/kaiser-permanentes-innovation-on-the-front-lines
[https://perma.cc/6KVW-GXR4].
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
Collaborative rule making that follows many of the design thinking steps—including
iterative development—has been successful in some government agencies already. See, e.g.,
Forshee, supra note 208 (“By engaging with FinTech, we will learn where the friction points
are between innovation and our regulations,” [CFTC Acting Chairman] Giancarlo said. “As
we meet with more and more innovators, we can expect to see patterns emerge—to see which
rules come up time and time again as the most problematic, the least able to adapt to evolving
technologies.”).
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consumer safety, environmental health, and positive economic expansion.221
But, as we explained in Part II, technology is developing so rapidly that
companies can have programs or business models up and running long before
regulators learn of their existence. For example, Uber created and used
Greyball—a program that allowed it to evade law enforcement in cities where
the platform company was under review—for three years before regulators
discovered its existence.222 By utilizing design-thinking principles in the
regulatory process, as behemoth private companies like Kaiser have done, rule
makers will have an appropriate tool to meet the changing industries they
regulate.223
The application of the design-thinking framework to the regulatory
process can manifest itself in a number of different ways, but the most
important functions must remain consistent:







221

The problem the rule is intended to address is identified
The relevant stakeholders identify their individual goals for new
regulation224
The stakeholders then meet to brainstorm solutions for the identified
problem
The best solutions are chosen, often by a smaller working group, and a
regulation is designed that implements these solutions
The initial regulation is presented to stakeholders, and feedback is
solicited
The stakeholders then revise their agreed-upon solutions and retest
them to make sure they address the identified problem

See examples of punitive measures that California regulators and New York City
regulators use, see generally Part II.
222
Greyball allowed Uber drivers to evade regulators attempting to ticket them for using the
service illegally in Portland, Oregon. The program was in use across the United States from
2014 to 2017. It was only brought to the authorities’ attention in 2014. See Isaac, supra note
139.
223
See generally Armitage, supra note 30. For a description of design thinking as used to
rethink the regulation of transportation and accommodation in Toronto, see MARS SOLUTION
LAB, SHIFTING PERSPECTIVES: REDESIGNING REGULATION FOR THE SHARING ECONOMY (Mar.
2016),
https://www.marsdd.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/MSL-Sharing-EconomyPublic-Design-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3GE-K298] (“The Sharing Economy Public
Design project, a partnership between MaRS Solutions Lab, the Province of Ontario and the
City of Toronto, applies a design perspective to this complex problem”).
224
See infra text accompanying note 229 for an example of the identification of stakeholders.
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These feedback loops continue until the most appropriate regulation is
produced
The new regulation is then tested in a smaller segment of the relevant
population in what is called a “beta test”
Feedback is solicited from the beta test users
This beta test will return new information to consider and the
stakeholders will revise the regulation
This process continues until the regulation best addresses problems
identified
Feedback loops remain open so that regulation can be easily amended
to account for new problems and new stakeholders
C. Applying Design Thinking to the Regulatory Process

Design thinking involves a nonlinear way of thinking and requires
real-world experimentation.225 The team chosen to undertake the process
together should be interdisciplinary and all should have the capacity and
disposition to think collaboratively.226 Unlike a multidisciplinary team in
which each person advocates for his or her own position, an interdisciplinary
team focuses on a collective ownership of ideas for which everyone takes
responsibility.227 “In its simplest form, design thinking is a process—
applicable to all walks of life—of creating new and innovative ideas and
solving problems.”228
1. Identify the Stakeholders
The underlying tenet of design thinking is that everyone affected or
involved in the use of that which is being designed should participate in the
225

See, e.g., Naiman, supra note 213 (“Methods for thinking like a designer include
observing, interviewing, creating personas, empathy mapping, storyboards, associational
thinking, creating low-tech prototypes, and decision-making analysis.”).
226
See generally TIM BROWN, CHANGE BY DESIGN (2009).
227
Id.
228
Kaan Turnali, What Is Design Thinking?, FORBES (May 10, 2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/sap/2015/05/10/what-is-design-thinking/#30147b7d3c18
[https://perma.cc/MR8J-QTNL]; design thinking has also been used as the basis for making
personal decisions. See generally BILL BARNETT & DALE EVANS, DESIGNING YOUR LIFE
(2016).
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design process. For example, for the creation of regulations for the ridesharing industry, the following stakeholders could be identified as having an
interest in the eventual rule:229











Ride-sharing companies
Car-sharing companies
Rental-car companies
Taxi companies
Local regulators
Public-transit systems
Airport representatives
City planners
Environmental-impact experts
Consumers

2. Stakeholders Convene and Decide the Goals and Public Value of Specific
Regulation
Public value includes not only consumer protection, fair competition,
and accessibility for all potential consumers, but also the social good that
comes from the availability of the innovative service or product the new
entrants to the industry provide.230 With design thinking, all stakeholders work
together to identify the public value of a specific area of regulation. For
example, taxi companies might identify the public value of regulations in the
pay-for-a-ride space as leveling the playing field for all participants in the
market. City planners and environmental experts might see the value of the
229

This list is based on the stakeholders identified in the MaRS Solution Lab report
undertaken for the city of Toronto. See MARS, supra note 223.
230
In a design thinking process for regulation, all stakeholders would be asked to consider the
public value of what they would want the regulation to achieve. See id. at 21 (“[d]esigning
effective regulation involves solving a trilemma: public value, administration and
innovation.”); Cf. Shayne Kavanagh, “Defining and Creating Public Value”, GOV. FINANCE
REV., 57, 60 (2014), http://www.gfoa.org/sites/default/files/GFROct1457_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BG53-7ZSH] (explaining how Mark Moore developed the concept of public
value to ask public officials to consider the benefits and costs of public services not only in
terms of dollars and cents, but also in terms of how government actions affect important civic
and democratic principles such as equity, liberty, responsiveness, transparency, participation,
and citizenship).
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data the companies would be required to share on the number and locations of
rides given, which would help them improve their estimates for future plans
and impacts. A new entrant to the market might favor regulations because
there would be a straightforward, user-friendly process of complying.
Alternatively, an entrant might ask for modifications to fit its specific business
model. Regulators might favor being an educated, engaged, and respected part
of the process of making the industry competitive, safe, and valuable to the
public at large.231
3. Stakeholders Brainstorm Possible Solutions
Stakeholders should first separately identify solutions and then bring them to a
brainstorming session with everyone together.232 The first half of this, the
independent brainstorming, utilizes divergent thinking, while the second half,
collaborating with others to create more broadly based solutions, is called
convergent thinking.233
4. Stakeholders Identify a Few Best Solutions and Implement Them
This implementation process is essentially a short-term pilot or
experiment in which the best regulations are put to use for a set period of
time.234 This part of the process could be referred to as a “sandbox” in which
ideas can be tried out and quickly eliminated or redesigned. At this point, a
smaller working group may be identified if not all stakeholders can devote the
time and energy this requires.
5. Solicit Feedback from Users
In the case of a pilot regulation, the regulation would not just be
published as a proposed rule, but would be immediately implemented.
231

For the words of a regulator instituting this sort of process, see Forshee, supra note 208.
See Art Markman, Your Team Is Brainstorming All Wrong, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 18,
2017), https://hbr.org/2017/05/your-team-is-brainstorming-all-wrong [https://perma.cc/3MRJWWGF].
233
Id.
234
An Introduction to Design Thinking: A Process Guide, HASSO PLATTNER INST. DESIGN AT
STAN., https://dschool-old.stanford.edu/sandbox/groups/designresources/wiki/36873/attachme
nts/74b3d/ModeGuideBOOTCAMP2010L.pdf [https://perma.cc/MUC5-8U28].
232
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Feedback would be solicited within a month or two from the companies
operating under the regulation, as well as from users and other stakeholders
impacted by the experimental regulation. This process is shorter and more
informal than the current extended comment period of proposed rules and
feedback is based not just on theoretical objections, but on experiences
operating under the rules.
6. Stakeholders Revise Solutions and Test Again
Based on user feedback and with input from all stakeholders, the pilot
regulation is revised and implemented for another testing period.
7. Solicit Feedback Again
Once again feedback is based on how the rules are working in the realworld.
8. Feedback Loops Continue Until an MVP Is Agreed Upon
The Minimum Viable Product (MVP) is still an early version that will
have ongoing feedback loops, but has met the minimum standards of the
stakeholders and so is released to the public to be more widely used and
tested.
9. New Process Allows Continuous Tweaking
For a regulatory process to be truly nimble and flexible, there will
have to be ways for users and stakeholders to engage with regulators on a
regular basis and work together to modify rules so that they are in line with
changes in technology and the marketplace.
10. These Steps Must Be Repeated for Each Industry
This is not a one-size-fits-all process. The stakeholders, the public
value, and the users will vary from one industry to another as will the
regulations.
What are the foreseeable problems in bringing design thinking to the
regulatory process? Possible trouble areas include:
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Getting startups to the table
Incentivizing regulators to participate
Identifying the correct stakeholders
Prototyping and effectively iterating regulations
Providing sufficient time for testing without making the process too
slow
Designing metrics that adequately summarize the impact the tested
regulations are having on various stakeholders like the companies
using them, the regulators enforcing them, and the public using the
new product or service235

Ideally, applying design thinking to the regulatory process will
transform the regulatory system. Under this system, agencies may be less
prone to regulatory capture236 because rather than enforcing stagnant rules
available for manipulation, they create and adapt living documents, more
easily amenable to change.
D. How Implementation of Design Thinking Could Address Harms Caused by
Culture Clash
As described in Part II, regulators were often playing catch up to Uber
and Airbnb as the innovative business models evolved and the companies’ use
of technology pivoted. Regulator’s limited access to resources, along with the
inherent nature of traditional bureaucratic processes, curbed their ability to
address new challenges brought about by innovation. Yet, despite this,
regulators and innovative companies share a common goal: expanding access
through transportation and accommodation. Unfortunately, the initial negative
interactions pitted the regulators against the platform companies, and muddled
any opportunity to recognize these commonalities. Overall, each stakeholder
impacted by the emergence of Uber and Airbnb incurred harms that arose
during the regulatory battles.
235

For some solutions to these possible issues, see generally Armitage, supra note 30, at 31–
34.
236
See Stigler, supra note 37. The ongoing nature of the proposed feedback loops should help
mitigate any threat of regulatory capture. A possibility of regulatory capture in the designthinking framework may remain, especially because regulators will spend more time
interacting in preliminary phases with innovative new companies.
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Design thinking has the potential to alleviate these harms. Below, we
posit how the design-thinking framework could alter outcomes for all
stakeholders:
1. To Citizens
The present regulatory system harms the public by not providing a
method by which citizens can be protected while innovative companies test
their products with early adopters.237 The iterative steps in a design-thinkingbased regulatory process would allow regulators to issue temporary safety
rules and assign liability while products and services are in the beta-testing
stage. The beta test itself could be limited by restricting the number of users to
reduce the extent of potential harms. In this new process, stakeholders would
convene regularly throughout the technology’s life cycle to reevaluate it. In
addition, regular communication and collaboration may allow regulators to
anticipate harms before they arise, and platform companies to address larger
crises before they occur.238

237

Consumer harms caused by Uber’s entry into the market are well documented. See Rob
Lieber, Airbnb Horror Story Points to Need for Precautions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/15/your-money/airbnb-horror-story-points-to-need-forprecautions.html [https://perma.cc/F64N-GYJL] (discussing the sexual assault and attempted
murder of an American student in an Airbnb in Madrid); see also Kale Williams & Curtis
Alexander, Uber Sued Over Girl’s Death in S.F., S.F. Gᴀᴛᴇ (Jan. 28, 2014),
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Uber-sued-over-girl-s-death-in-S-F-5178921.php
[https://perma.cc/EL4A-PFHE] (discussing how an Uber driver struck a young girl in a hit
and run accident in a San Francisco neighborhood); Niamh McIntire, Uber London Ban: The
Scandals That Brought Down the Ride Hailing App, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 22, 2017),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/uber-london-ban-latest-news-scandalsrape-women-sexual-assault-ride-hailing-app-tfl-india-a7961236.html [https://perma.cc/GEQ5J9C4] (discussing Uber’s widely publicized rape case in Delhi, India—one of the issues that
led to the Uber ban in London). The term “early adopter” is well-known in the technology
community and refers to the first small group of users who are eager to try out new
innovations being tested in the marketplace for proof of concept and viability. Brian Kennedy
and Cary Funk, 28% of Americans are ‘Strong’ Early Adopters of Technology, PEW RES. CTR
(July 12, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/12/28-of-americans-arestrong-early-adopters-of-technology/ [https://perma.cc/C3JN-MD4E].
238
If company data—for example, indicating the most highly used drop-off locations for
early-morning ridesharing—was shared with regulators, municipal officials might recognize
that to ease traffic congestion, traffic light automation patterns needed to be altered. Or, if
certain neighborhoods draw most home-sharing bookings, regulators might decide to limit the
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2. To Cities
Both Airbnb and Uber have disrupted large incumbent industries and,
in doing so, have fundamentally changed the way cities function. For
example, public transit systems have been impacted by the significant portion
of citizens who now rely on ride sharing companies as their primary method
of transportation.239 Similarly, consumers rely on Airbnb as an affordable
alternative to costly hotels. As a result, both platform companies have had
unforeseen effects on the city’s economy, ecosystem, and environment, such
as pressure on the real estate market, increased traffic, diminished air
quality,240 and increased signs of wealth inequality.241 In a regulatory process
that follows the design thinking method, the inclusion of all stakeholders
increases the likelihood that these sorts of potential impacts will be identified
early in the process. The collaborative aspects of design thinking methods
could also facilitate data sharing between platform companies and regulators

number of listings available in that area to maintain the character of the neighborhood for its
residents.
239
Mary Wisnewski, Ride-Sharing Services Like Uber Cutting Into Public Transit Use in
Chicago, Elsewhere: Study, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 19, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
local/breaking/ct-met-ride-hailing-survey-20171016-story.html
[https://perma.cc/4DARH8LF]. In some locations, ridesharing has become a valuable option for the daily commute.
For example, in the fall of 2017, in San Francisco, a Lyft line can sometimes cost only $1.25
more than taking the bus (based on tests conducted by the authors). While this is more
expensive, riders might consider it “worth it” for speed, comfort, and reliability.
240
See Kate Gilbraith, Are Uber and Lyft Helping or Hurting the Environment, GUARDIAN
(Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/jan/21/uber-lyft-helpinghurting-environment-climate-change [https://perma.cc/ZQM8-X8EK]; see also Doug Tribou,
In the Age of Airbnb, Michigan Beach Towns Try to Balance Renters and Residents, MICH.
RADIO (Apr. 28, 2017), http://michiganradio.org/post/age-airbnb-michigan-beach-towns-trybalance-renters-and-residents [https://perma.cc/L5UN-FJTG]. For impacts to the economy,
see Fawn Johnson, How Airbnb and Uber are Changing the Nature of Work, ATLANTIC (Nov.
13, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/11/how-airbnb-and-uber-arechanging-the-nature-of-work/425402/ [https://perma.cc/4RPA-RBCE]; see also Nathan
Heller, Is the Gig-Economy Working? Many Liberals Have Embraced the Gig Economy. But
Can They Survive It?, NEW YORKER (May 15, 2017), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2
017/05/15/is-the-gig-economy-working [https://perma.cc/DB8U-LJ8D].
241
See Keith Parkins, The Secret to the Uber Economy Is Wealth Inequality, MEDIUM (Dec.
15, 2014), https://medium.com/dark-mountain/the-secret-to-the-uber-economy-is-wealthinequality-800859791a91 [https://perma.cc/EBZ2-AQYM].
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without resorting to the costly lawsuits described in Part II. 242 In this way, a
process that mandates collaboration early on could turn regulations into
mechanisms that meet the diverse goals of urban planners, politicians, law
enforcement, and platform companies.
3. To Micro-Entrepreneurs243
In 2014, Airbnb CEO Brian Chesky aptly noted that the rise of
platform companies created a third category of commercial activity—one that
describes people in their individual capacity functioning like businesses.244
Initially, drivers and hosts bore all the costs for the services they provided
through Uber and Airbnb; the press is full of stories of guests trashing Airbnb

242

Cf. Stephen Melendez, Sharing Economy Giants Are Using Data To Build “The Taking
Economy,”
Study
Warns,
FAST
COMPANY
(Mar.
14,
2017),
https://www.fastcompany.com/3068881/sharing-economy-taking-economy-uber-airbnb-dataasymmetry-study [https://perma.cc/78DS-9Y22] (describing how companies like Uber and
Airbnb are the only ones in possession of data that regulators need, stating that “it’s likely that
some innovation and experimentation will be required on the part of regulators, too, to find
the best way to find and address potential abuses by sharing-economy companies”); Ryan
Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 117 COLUM. L.
REV. 1623 (2017) (advocating for the use of consumer protection laws to address “the
asymmetries of information” in the sharing economy).
243
The individuals providing services through the platform companies are often called micro
entrepreneurs. See Armitage, supra note 30, at 11; see also Andy Kessler, Brian Chesky: The
‘Sharing Economy’ and Its Enemies, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304049704579321001856708992 (quoting
Brian Chesky: “I want to live in a world where people can become entrepreneurs or microentrepreneurs”). The concept of micro-entrepreneurs arose as a result of the business models
of Uber, Airbnb, and other platform companies. These companies have taken the position that
those individuals who provide the services offered through their technology are not their
employees, but instead are independent contractors simply using the platform to connect with
those who would like to utilize their services. See generally Benjamin Means & Joseph
Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1511 (2016); see also Keith
Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in the Modern
Economy, 19 B.U.L. REV. 1673 (2016).
244
This distinction between employee and independent contractor remains controversial, and
is currently the subject of considerable litigation with many of the platform companies. In the
summer of 2017, Uber was embroiled in a costly class-action over fares with drivers. See
David Streitfield, Uber Drivers Win Preliminary Class Action Status in Labor Case, N.Y.
TIMES (July 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/business/uber-drivers-classaction.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4RDM-VWUV].
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rentals and passengers damaging the backseats of the cars belonging to their
Uber drivers.245
The platform companies are able to collect considerable amounts of
data on where and when the micro-entrepreneurs on their platforms are
providing services.246 This data is valuable to regulators and other government
officials as a means of understanding and predicting how to make their
localities function better for their citizenry.247 As was made clear in the
regulatory battles of Uber and Airbnb described in Part II, the platform
companies are reluctant to share this data, claiming that the privacy of their
users is at issue.248 As part of the settlements that Airbnb eventually reached
with the state of New York and the city of San Francisco, the company agreed
to share some of its data with regulators. Uber has agreed to share some
aspects of its data, but not all.249
245

In one nightmare-inducing story that made headlines, a home in Calgary Canada was
destroyed after an Airbnb guest threw a party. Airbnb did not provide compensation to the
hosts. Olivia Waxman, This House Was Totally Trashed After Being Rented on Airbnb, TIME
(Apr. 30, 2015), http://time.com/3841703/airbnb-calgary/ [https://perma.cc/H6B5-T9N8].
246
Airbnb collects data from its hosts, but there is little published on the exact extent of that
data collection. See Kim-Mai Cutler, Airbnb and the Problem of Data, TECHCRUNCH (June
11,
2015),
https://techcrunch.com/2015/06/11/airbnb-and-the-problem-of-data/
[https://perma.cc/B8EZ-P5MM]. Uber also collects data from its riders and drivers, often
through controversial programs. See supra text accompanying note 130; see also How Uber
Uses Data to Improve Their Service and Create the New Wave of Mobility, KISSMETRICS,
https://blog.kissmetrics.com/how-uber-uses-data/ [https://perma.cc/8S9E-ET3L].
247
Airbnb already shares their data with cities. See Meghan Rose Dickey, Airbnb Settles
Lawsuits
with
San
Francisco,
TECHCRUNCH
(May
1,
2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/05/01/airbnb-settles-lawsuit-with-san-francisco/
[https://perma.cc/2VQ3-ABZB]. Uber has been sharing some traffic data with city planners
since January 2017. See Mike Isaac, Uber Extends Olive Branch to Cities, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/08/technology/uber-movement-traffic-data.html
[https://perma.cc/65B2-BGMY].
248
See supra text accompanying note 79 and citations referenced therein.
249
While Uber’s open source data set will be valuable to urban planners (see Isaac, supra note
247), Uber is not likely to start sharing rider or driver data with governments. Unlike Airbnb,
all of Uber’s data is anonymous. See John Riberio, Uber Offers Cities ‘Anonymized’ Ride
Data, PCWORLD (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.pcworld.com/article/3155494/techologybusiness/uber-to-provide-anonymized-data-to-city-officials.html
[https://perma.cc/2EVHP7NN]. There is a major privacy concern with ride sharing platforms’ data collection; Cheryl
Miller, Uber and Lyft Resist California Regulators’ Appeal for Data Sharing, LEGAL TECH
NEWS (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.law.com/legaltechnews/almID/1202800136629
[https://perma.cc/22W3-8HU2].
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In a design-thinking-based regulatory process, data sharing would no
doubt be one of the aspects of the early solutions offered in return for
regulations that enabled new innovative businesses to operate, both in betatesting phases as well as long-term. This kind of early collaboration would
avoid the expenses wasted on confrontations that eventually resulted in
exactly this sort of data-sharing, and could also address some of the privacy
concerns that the micro-entrepreneurs have voiced in these battles.250 With
early beta-testing data, both regulators and innovators would be better able to
see how consumers, micro-entrepreneurs, and others were at risk from this
new business, and could collaborate on how regulation could allocate or
protect against those risks.
4. To Platform Companies
In Part II, we examined the costly battles Uber and Airbnb have waged
around the world. In mid-2016 Uber was fighting more than 70 lawsuits in
U.S. federal court.251 Those costs are likely to continue until Uber is more
willing to compromise with regulators.252 In some cities—notably Vancouver
and Austin—Uber has been banned for good.253 Airbnb has suffered a ban in
the major market of New York and a faced legislative attack in San
Francisco.254 Further, after spending countless hours and an exorbitant amount
of money fighting required data-sharing with San Francisco regulators, Airbnb
not only agreed to share data from its platform but also accepted the potential
250

See Miller, supra note 249. Airbnb’s concerns about user privacy largely fueled the battle
it waged with rule makers in a number of locales, including Los Angeles. See Melanie Mason,
Citing Privacy Concerns, Airbnb Slams Bill on Short-Term Rentals, L.A. TIMES, (Apr. 21,
2015),
http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-airbnb-legislation-20150421story.html [https://perma.cc/PA6L-W7LG].
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Marisa Kendall, Uber Battling More than 70 Lawsuits in Federal Courts, MERCURY NEWS
(Aug. 11, 2016), http://www.mercurynews.com/2016/07/04/uber-battling-more-than-70lawsuits-in-federal-courts/ [https://perma.cc/9CD7-2ZAT] (giving details of lawsuits and
settlements in 2015–16).
252
Id. (detailing antitrust claims against Uber in New York over price-fixing that could be
worth $1 billion).
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Ryan Craggs, Where Uber is Banned Around the World, CONDÉ NAST TRAVELLER (Apr.
15,
2017),
https://www.cntraveler.com/story/where-uber-is-banned-around-the-world
[perma.cc/M2DH-2UTP]; see also Nibler, supra note 162 (Uber banned from operating in
London due to deceptive practices).
254
Craggs, supra note 253.
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for criminal liability should it fail to comply with regulation. 255 Criminal
liability was not mentioned prior to Airbnb’s resistance to San Francisco's
2015 regulations that required data sharing. Arguably the city would not have
created, nor Airbnb accepted, such a severe penalty if collaboration had begun
earlier.
The companies in our case study burned through investment dollars
and revenue in their regulatory battles,256 were distracted from growing their
businesses in competitive markets,257 and lost investor confidence—an
important asset for a pre-IPO company.258 A design-thinking-based regulation
process would make these harsh punitive measures (such as cease-and-desist
letters, fines, and litigation) a final option instead of an initial contact, and
would provide regulators with the most appropriate tools available to meet
their goals. In addition, this process would allow platform companies to make
functional changes to their products without public relations crises because
regulators and innovators would convene regularly as markets and technology
changed.
A collaborative and iterative process that enables regulators and
innovators to communicate often will slow punitive practices, since both
regulators and innovators would have a better understanding of mutual
expectations. We should not force innovators to conform to old rules written
to apply to different ways of doing business—regulators must also innovate.
In return, platform companies must be more collaborative. Innovators must
recognize that regulators serve an important purpose, and that the safety of
their cities should be their goal as well.259
255

Airbnb faces criminal liability if it does not comply with San Francisco regulations. See
supra text accompanying note 204; see also, Carolyn Said, Airbnb, Under the Gun, Is Ready
to
Cooperate
with
SF,
S.F.
CHRONICLE
(Nov.
14,
2016),
http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Airbnb-under-the-gun-is-ready-to-cooperatewith-10612040.php [perma.cc/85U8-WTUK].
256
See supra Part II.
257
Instead of focusing on perfecting their business model, Airbnb has had to focus largely on
regulatory battles. See Benner, supra note 205.
258
NYU Stern School of Business Professor Arun Sundajararajan states that regulatory battles
and regulation are still the biggest sources of uncertainty about Airbnb’s future revenue
streams. See Katie Benner, Airbnb Settles Lawsuit with Its Hometown, San Francisco, N.Y.
TIMES (MAY 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/technology/airbnb-san-franciscosettle-registration-lawsuit.html.
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The authors recognize that there are a number of obstacles that could arise through their
suggested process. First it is difficult to identify the stakeholders. Second, within the design-
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Benefits of a Design-Thinking-Based Regulatory Process
The impact of regulatory capture and other barriers to entry created by
traditional regulatory processes can be seen in both the taxi and the hotel
industries. In the taxi industry, the practice of limiting the number of licensed
drivers260 allowed demand to swell far past supply. This permitted taxi
companies to get lazy and not innovate with new technology (no reason to
create an expensive online demand system) or upgrade the rider experience
(cars were dirty, drivers were rude, minority riders were routinely not picked
up).261 This happened in cities around the country and created a pain point that
the ride-sharing companies exploited to rapidly build a large user base. That
large base was then used as leverage when state and local governments
attempted to regulate the companies.262
thinking framework, regulators will function in entirely different roles and become active
agents in their industries. Third, the possibility of regulatory capture in the design-thinking
framework may remain; this is especially risky because regulators will spend more time
interacting in preliminary phases with innovative new companies. See Armitage, supra note
30. While design thinking may not be perfect, it may very well be a better system than what
presently exists. Winston Churchill once conveyed a similar view of democratic government.
Cf. Winston Churchill, Speech Before House of Commons 11/11/49, cited by World
Association
of
International
Study
(WAIS)
Forum
on
Democracy
http://wais.stanford.edu/Democracy/democracy_DemocracyAndChurchill%28090503%29.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/ZW3J-JGRS] (quoting Winston Churchill’s famous admonition that “[i]t
has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except for all the others that
have been tried.”).
260
See Van Gelder, supra note 62.
261
See Downes, supra note 41 (“Look inside a typical taxicab today and you’ll find little in
the way of technological sophistication. Just a meter (introduced in 1897), a two-way radio
(circa 1940), and maybe a GPS device (not likely—after all, getting lost earns you more
money).”).
262
See Derek Thompson, How Uber’s Taxi App Is Changing Cities, ATLANTIC (Nov. 23,
2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/11/how-ubers-taxi-app-is-changingcities/281451/ [perma.cc/XN4B-KQUW] (describing a late-night attempt to pass a law to
effectively ban Uber prompted a voracious social media response, including 37,000 tweets,
which eventually defeated the so-called Uber Amendment); Airbnb has also used this
technique, spending $8 million to defeat a proposition in San Francisco that would have
restricted short-term rentals. See Alejandro Lazo, San Francisco Voters Reject Airbnb
Initiative, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/san-francisco-votersreject-airbnb-initiative-1446622854.
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Similarly, the hotel industry complied with regulations to protect
guests and employed union workers on their properties. This resulted in
expensive rates that were acceptable in the world of business travelers, but
ignored the desires and financial realities of those who wanted to travel for
fun and adventure, who desired uniqueness in accommodations and could not
or did not want to pay for the same room in the same hotel room everywhere
they went. The hotel industry’s blindness to this type of user permitted the
home-sharing companies to explode on the scene, offering a unique
experience at any price.263
Thus, the failure of various industries to accommodate users limits
growth and innovation. Stagnant regulations then artificially protect
companies from outside pressures that would otherwise force them to reinvent
their business models as technology and populations change. Nevertheless, the
importance of regulations cannot be denied. Without such protections,
consumer harm is more likely. This is not just an abstract concept—harm
occurs often when regulations don’t exist or are not sufficiently stringent. For
example, lax regulations were largely blamed for the Grenfel Tower fire in
London, where flammable materials were used as exterior siding, resulting in
more than 70 deaths in a fire that quickly exploded out of control.264 In the
ride-sharing space, the lack of adequate insurance was ignored until a little
girl was run over by an Uber driver.265As a result of that accident, the
California Department of Insurance worked with private insurance companies
to develop a product that would cover a driver engaged in commercial
activities. Airbnb had a similar issue when a guest trashed a host’s property
before leaving and now guarantees hosts $1,000,000 in insurance to protect
against such damage. These sorts of insurance policies might well have been
263

One hospitality website estimates that seventy-eight percent of consumers are now looking
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User
Experience,
CVENT
(Sept.
16,
2016),
https://blog.cvent.com/hospitality/sales-marketing/airbnb-user-experience/ [perma.cc/CXR4MU54]. Hotels, having realized the profitability of the market Airbnb discovered, are now
advertising “local” experiences; see also Liz Moyer, Hotels, Feeling the Pinch of Airbnb,
Promote
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Experiences,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
29,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/29/travel/hotels-feeling-the-pinch-of-airbnb-promotelocal-experiences.html [perma.cc/KNJ5-2LUX].
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David D. Kirkpatrick, et al., Why Grenfell Tower Burned: Regulators Put Cost Before
Safety, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/24/world/europe/gren
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developed within a design-thinking collaborative process with all stakeholders
contributing their expertise to foresee possible problems.
These examples point out another issue with respect to the current
regulatory regime. It is a reactive system in which regulators generally wait
for a problem to arise before getting involved. The reactive deliberative
process of traditional regulation may have been appropriate when product and
service development cycles were slower and user uptake gradual. In such a
system, regulators could be informed of problems before users were harmed.
With fast-paced, innovative companies, regulators need to be educated and
informed about what is taking place in the industries they regulate so that
issues can be spotted in advance and dealt with in a timely and thorough
manner. In order for that to happen, the regulatory process must be nimble,
flexible and user-focused. In the past, that has not been the approach and it has
led to much money, time, and effort being wasted by both regulators and
entrepreneurs. However, with the future of driverless cars arriving quickly
some regulators have adopted new procedures and proactively issued rules or
at least principles to guide these cars as they are developed. 266 Of course,
more must be done to ensure that driverless cars and their passengers are safe
on our roads, but there is hope for thinking that traditional patterns of
regulation may be open to change when guidelines have been issued by the
federal government as well as state government years before the products are
ready to be launched publicly.
A new regulatory process using design thinking to create new rules for
an industry that is about to be disrupted would have many advantages. Any
jurisdiction utilizing such an approach would have an advantage recruiting
new companies to the area because founders would know that regulators want
to find a way to support their businesses and that the municipality or region is
266

In an example of design-like thinking, the National Highway Safety Traffic Administration
issued guidelines on autonomous vehicles last fall. See Alex Davies, The Feds Just Got Real
About Self-Driving Cars (It’s About Time), WIRED (Sept. 19, 2016),
https://www.wired.com/2016/09/feds-just-got-real-self-driving-cars-time/ [perma.cc/CN6TYEJB] (quoting President Obama as saying “[g]overnment sometimes gets it wrong when it
comes to rapidly changing technologies. That’s why this new policy is flexible and designed
to evolve with new advances.”). In the absence of federal legislation, many states have written
their own laws governing autonomous vehicles. However, Congress is currently considering
preempting all state laws with respect to autonomous vehicles and replacing them with
national standards. See, e.g., Aarian Marshall, Congress Finally Gets Going on that
Regulating Robocars Thing, WIRED (June 21, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/congressautonomous-self-driving-car-regulations/ [perma.cc/2TJB-WTML].
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itself innovative and thus likely to be good place to launch new ideas.267
Regulators would be happy with the process because they would not have to
wait for a consumer harm or public outcry shaming their lack of effective
response before being able to investigate the issue.268 Moreover, a pilot
regulation designed by all stakeholders is likely to include more data and
information so that a regulator would have ways to measure the impact of the
rules. In this way, regulation will become performance-based and data-driven.
Overall, the economy of the area would be more efficient, with less time and
money spent on confrontation, with a level playing field for old and new
companies in an industry, and with the private and public assets of the
community better utilized. For these reasons, design thinking can produce a
regulatory process that is a winning situation for everyone involved.
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Forecasting San Francisco’s Economic Future, SPUR (Feb. 27, 2014),
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